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Abstract
We estimate the eﬀects of deregulation of U.S. banking restrictions on the amount of
interstate personal income insurance during the period 1970–2001. Interstate income
insurance occurs when personal income reacts less than one-to-one to state-speciﬁc
shocks to output. We ﬁnd that income insurance improved after banking deregulation,
and that this eﬀect is larger in states where small businesses are more important. We
further show that the impact of deregulation is stronger for proprietors’ income than
other components of personal income. Our explanation of this result centers on the
role of banks as a prime source of small business ﬁnance and on the close intertwining
of the personal and business ﬁnances of small business owners. Our analysis casts light
on the real eﬀects of bank deregulation, on the risk sharing function of banks, and on
the integration of bank markets.
Keywords: Financial deregulation, integration of bank markets, interstate risk shar-
ing, small business ﬁnance.
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Since the 1970s, the structure of the U.S. banking industry has changed considerably follow-
ing deregulation of restrictions on branching and interstate banking. The ensuing wave of
consolidation has increased the average bank company size and allowed banks to expand into
new geographical markets by operating larger branch networks or bank holding companies.
Banks play a central role in the allocation of capital in the economy and is the prime source
of ﬁnance to small businesses, and we examine if these changes in bank market structure
has had real eﬀects for small business owners.1 In particular, we examine whether interstate
personal income insurance increased after deregulation: we compare income insurance in
states where small businesses are respectively more and less prevalent and we consider the
sensitivity of proprietors’ income to state-level output shocks. By income insurance, we
mean the extent to which, in a given state, state-speciﬁc personal income ﬂuctuates with
state-speciﬁc shocks to output. In states that are ﬁnancially integrated with other states,
agents may trade claims on output (e.g., equity or direct investments) across state borders,
thereby sharing state-speciﬁc risks with residents of other states, insulating personal income
from ﬂuctuations in state-level output. Through transactions with intermediaries such as
banks, agents share output risks indirectly via the contracts they hold with the bank, and
banks, in turn, share risk with other states. If banking deregulation has improved inte-
gration of previously separated bank markets, interstate income insurance may well have
improved.
The eﬀect of banking deregulation on income insurance is estimated using annual state-
level data for the period 1970–2001. We ﬁrst establish that banking deregulation has a
positive eﬀect on income insurance overall using four alternative measures of deregulation—
two measures of intrastate banking deregulation and two measures of interstate banking
deregulation. From regressions which do not control for other potential determinants of
risk sharing, the marginal eﬀect of deregulation is in excess of 10 percentage points, in the
sense that an additional 10 percent, or more, of a state-speciﬁc output shock is smoothed
on average. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that the impact of deregulation is larger in states where
small businesses are more prevalent: in states with many small businesses the improvement
in income insurance is in the order of 20 percentage points. Our results suggest that
bank consolidation within deregulated states is particularly important for this eﬀect. We
1We deﬁne small businesses as those having less than 100 employees—with this deﬁnition, small busi-
nesses comprise an important part of the economy. In the average state, businesses with less then 100
employees made up 58 percent of total employment in 1978. (The Small Business Administration deﬁnes
small businesses as having less than 500 full-time equivalent employees.)
1explore whether other contemporaneous developments in ﬁnancial markets may explain
the estimated increase in risk sharing and ﬁnd that, in particular, the higher impact of
deregulation on risk sharing in states with more small businesses is a robust result. We
provide additional evidence for our hypothesis by showing that the impact of banking reform
is considerably larger for proprietors’ income than for other components of personal income.
Banking deregulation have mainly taken two forms: intrastate deregulation, which al-
lowed banks to branch statewide, and interstate deregulation which allowed the forma-
tion of multi-state bank holding companies. While the labels may suggest that inter-state
deregulation should be the main determinant of inter-state risk sharing, in fact, banking
deregulations may improve risk sharing in several ways. First, deregulation may aﬀect the
interaction between small ﬁrms and their banks and, second, banks may share risk bet-
ter with out-of-state agents such as banks or individuals after reforms. We discuss these
dimensions in turn.
The informational opaqueness of small businesses without an established reputation for
quality prevents them from raising arm’s-length ﬁnance in public markets. Banks, on the
other hand, may mitigate such informational asymmetries through repeated interaction and
monitoring (Diamond (1984, 1991), and Rajan (1992)). When a bank provides ﬁnance to
a ﬁrm, it shares risk with the ﬁrm’s owners by bearing a part of the ﬁrm’s output risk.
This may be especially important for small businesses as they depend on bank loans for
their operations. In contrast, when a business is entirely self-ﬁnanced by the owner, the
owner bears all output risk himself and cannot insure his personal income from shocks to
his business. This is reﬂected in the cross-sectional pattern of state-level income insurance
that we establish: states with many small businesses exhibit a lower average level of income
insurance. The ﬁnding is consistent with Agronin (2003), who ﬁnds that income insurance
is lower in states where proprietors’ income makes up a larger share of personal income.
Banking deregulation may have improved the insurance of personal income by increasing
the availability of small business ﬁnance, whether to new or existing borrowers. Alterna-
tively, even if the total volume of small business loans were unchanged, banking deregulation
may have altered banks’ pattern of lending, allowing small business owners to further the
separation of their personal ﬁnances from those of their ﬁrm. This latter channel points
to the importance of bank-borrower relationships for the eﬃciency of the capital allocation
process. In a valuable bank-borrower relationship, the bank may have incentives to oﬀer
(self-enforcing) implicit contracts that facilitate insurance, for example through the contin-
ued extension of credit during bad times (Allen and Gale (2000) and Boot (2000)). Each
of these two channels would work to lower the correlation between output and personal
2income. Intrastate deregulation, which removed barriers to competition among banks is
likely to be particularly relevant for small business lending.
Along the other dimension, banking reform aﬀects interbank risk sharing as a result
of mergers and acquisitions across state borders and the formation of multi-state bank
holding companies. Houston, James, and Marcus (1997) demonstrate that bank holding
companies manage capital and liquidity at the consolidated level. However, also mergers
within state borders aﬀect risk sharing. Intrastate mergers create larger banks which are
typically more integrated in national markets than small local banks. For example, a large
bank such as Citibank has extensive nation-wide (indeed, world-wide) operations compared
to a small town savings bank. Furthermore, banks share risk with other banks and ﬁnancial
institutions by borrowing and lending in U.S.-wide interbank and money markets. Banks
may borrow and lend out-of-state in order to help stabilize income of small business owners.2
Hence, bank actions may aﬀect income insurance also without explicit multi-state cross-
ownership between banks.3
The disproportionate increase in income insurance that we ﬁnd for states with many
small businesses is striking. We conjecture that deregulation may have altered the pattern
of banks’ small business lending in two ways: 1) improved eﬃciency of the banks operating
after deregulation leading to, e.g., better screening or monitoring of small business borrow-
ers, or ﬁnancially less constrained banks which have more leeway for sharing risk within
small businesses, and 2) improved eﬃciency of interbank capital allocation, in the sense
that deregulation improved banks’ ability to share risks amongst themselves, the beneﬁts
of which were passed on to small business borrowers. We discuss the empirical evidence
underlying these conjectures in Section 4.
Call Report data on small business lending by U.S. banks has been reported only since
1993.4 Hence, we cannot directly test for changes in banks’ patterns of small business
lending following deregulation. However, we provide evidence that state-speciﬁc personal
2For example, banks in an agricultural state can stabilize income in that state by borrowing in the face
of adverse weather shocks.
3Banking deregulation may have aﬀected interstate income insurance in other ways which are not neces-
sarily related to small businesses. One channel may work through the capital income of households. Personal
income have been smoothed through households’ capital income if changes in the size of bank organizations
smoothed income streams earned by owners of securities issued by banks. Banks are owned, perhaps indi-
rectly, by individual stock holders who ultimately bear the risk of the banks’ operations. When stock holders
live out-of-state, this results in interstate income insurance. Alternatively, multi-state bank organizations
may disperse the eﬀect of state-speciﬁc shocks to the banking industry itself throughout the organization.
For example, following losses in one state, layoﬀs and cost-cuttings may be extended to subsidiaries and
branches in other states. Or further, if bank ﬁnance makes it easier for ﬁrms to raise external non-bank
ﬁnance, banking deregulation may have helped smooth dividends paid by such ﬁrms.
4See, e.g., Wolken (1998).
3income is smoothed more following deregulation and that this improvement in income
insurance is stronger in states with a relatively high prevalence of small businesses. We
also demonstrate that proprietors’ income became less pro-cyclical following deregulation.
These patterns are consistent with our hypothesis that banks’ small business lending is
important for the insurance of small business owners’ income and that this channel of
income insurance became more eﬀective following deregulation.
Other papers have documented the real eﬀects of branching deregulations in the United
States. In an important contribution, Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) show that state per
capita growth increased in states that deregulated, both when measured in terms of personal
income and state GDP.5 Our ﬁndings are closely related to those of Jayaratne and Strahan
as both papers identify banking deregulation as an impetus for an economic process with
signiﬁcant real eﬀects at the macro level. In this paper, we identify the link between banks’
insurance role in the ﬁnancing of small businesses as a potential channel of welfare gain
from bank integration. Petersen and Rajan (1994) ﬁnd evidence that small businesses in
the United States beneﬁt from lending relationships and our results complement theirs by
pointing to the value of bank relationships in small businesses ﬁnance.
Our paper is also related to research on the integration of U.S. states. Morgan, Rime,
and Strahan (2004) ﬁnd that consolidation into multi-state bank holding companies has low-
ered state output volatility and made state business cycles more alike. Asdrubali, Sørensen,
and Yosha (1996) study income insurance through cross-regional holdings of debt and equity
(“capital market income smoothing”) and through the super-regional tax-transfer system
(“federal government income smoothing”).6
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents and discusses the
premises for our hypothesis that the eﬀect of banking deregulation on interstate income
insurance is particularly strong for small business owners. Section 3 brieﬂy presents the
history of banking deregulation in the United States. Section 4 discusses in more detail
the channels through which deregulation may aﬀect the insurance of state-speciﬁc personal
income and Section 5 considers issues of robustness. Section 6 describes our data, Section 7
presents our measure of interstate income insurance, and Section 8 presents the empirical
5They also demonstrate that branching deregulations are exogenous to state-level growth, that is, states
did not tend to deregulate in the expectation of an imminent economic upturn.
6Atkeson and Bayoumi (1993) seem to have been the ﬁrst to bring up the issue of income insurance across
U.S. states through private capital markets. See also Crucini (1999) for another early paper on risk sharing
across U.S. states. Sala-i Martin and Sachs (1992) suggest that the federal government in the United States
provides substantial income insurance to states through procyclical taxes and countercyclical transfers. That
paper, and many following it, has focussed on U.S. states as members of a successful currency union (the
United States) that should be studied as a model for the formation of currency unions such as the European
Monetary Union.
4results. Section 9 concludes.
2 Small business ﬁnance and U.S. evidence
Our hypothesis, that personal income insurance improved after deregulation through banks’
small business lending, builds on two fundamental observations: 1) small ﬁrms depend
heavily on bank-intermediated ﬁnance, 2) owners’ ﬁnancial position is closely intertwined
with that of their business.7 In the following, we discuss this evidence and its relation to
our hypothesis.
It is well-established empirically that bank-intermediated ﬁnance is one of the main
sources of small business funding in the United States. For example, Berger and Udell
(1998) present evidence from the 1993 National Survey of Small Business Finance (NSSBF)
which demonstrates that small businesses rely heavily on commercial bank ﬁnance from
their very ﬁrst years. According to the survey, bank debt constitutes 16 percent of total
assets for “infant” (0–2 years) ﬁrms, and 31 percent of “adolescent” (3–4 years) ﬁrms. For
older ﬁrms, the ratio is 17 percent (on average). This is compared to total equity stakes
of 48 percent, 39 percent and 52 percent, respectively (ibid, table 1, p. 620). Commercial
bank debt is, overall, the most important external source of ﬁnance.8
An important characteristic of small business ﬁnance is the intertwining of business
owners’ ﬁnancial position with that of their business. Hence, funds (mostly in the form
of equity) provided by the principal owner is the most important source, amounting to
35 percent of all funding (overall). Trade credit is the third most important source of
funds. Furthermore, outside ﬁnance often has personal commitments attached. Avery
et al. (1999) report that 80 percent of the small ﬁrms which have loans, have loans with
personal commitments.9 Ang (1992) reports that about 40 percent of small business loans
and 60 percent of loan dollars are guaranteed and/or secured by personal assets. Berger
and Udell (1998) ﬁnd that 90 percent of commercial bank debt is secured.
The 1993 NSSBF also documents the importance of ﬁnance, esp. equity, from insider
sources other than the owner, that is, from family, friends and other people involved in
7Ang (1992), Berger and Udell (1998), and Avery, Bostic, and Samolyk (1999).
8The most common form of small business debt supplied by commercial banks—constituting 56 percent
of total small business debt—is lines of credit. The next most important loan types are mortgage and
equipment loans, 15 percent and 10 percent, respectively (Berger and Udell (1998)).
9That is, loans with either personal collateral or a personal guarantee attached. In the case of personal
collateral, the creditor holds a prioritized claim on speciﬁc assets of the borrower and controls the use of
the assets. A personal guarantee is a more general claim on personal wealth which places fewer restrictions
on the guarantor’s use of his wealth. The ﬁgures are based on the 1987 and 1993 NSSBF and the Survey of
Consumer Finances.
5the business. Such equity was the second most important source of equity, constituting 13
percent of total assets (Berger and Udell (1998)).
The above observations are, of course, consistent with the notion that agency conﬂicts
rooted in asymmetries of information are severe for small businesses. As noted above,
the interpretation of our results centers on the dependency of small businesses on bank
intermediated ﬁnance.10 It is exactly because the average small business has no real sub-
stitutes for bank ﬁnance, other than own funds or funds raised from family and friends,
that part of the eﬃciency gain from banking deregulation is likely to work through small
businesses. Through the requirement of part self-ﬁnancing, collateral and guarantees, and
through monitoring and repeated interaction over time, banks may mitigate problems of
adverse selection and moral hazard.11
Banking deregulation may have improved personal income insurance by increasing the
availability of small business loans or by altering the lending pattern of banks. For illustra-
tion, consider an entirely self-ﬁnanced sole proprietorship. In this case, the small business
owner bears all the ﬁrms output risk himself—shocks to the surplus created in the ﬁrm will
be transferred one-to-one to his personal income. When the owner obtains external ﬁnance,
the linkage between his personal ﬁnances and those of the business is relaxed and the co-
variation of personal income with output may fall. Banks may share risk with the owner
by avoiding initiation of formal bankruptcy procedures or liquidation of assets when the
business hits hard times, allowing the borrower to fall behind with payments of interest and
installments.12 When businesses default, banks share risk by absorbing part of the losses.
Furthermore, the availability of external ﬁnance may help small business owners smooth
their income to the extent it furthers diversiﬁcation of the owners’ sources of income. It
may facilitate accumulation of savings outside the business, e.g., in housing or ﬁnancial in-
vestments, generating a stream of future income that is less than perfectly correlated with
the success of the business.
10Although venture and angel ﬁnance are substitutes for some small ﬁrms, the above studies show that in
terms of magnitude, these sources do not represent a real alternative to bank ﬁnance for the average ﬁrm.
11See also Leland and Pyle (1977), Bester (1985), Besanko and Thakor (1987), and Holmstrom and Tirole
(1997).
12In a study of U.K. ﬁrms in distress, Franks and Sussman (2005) ﬁnd that banks typically attempt to
rescue the ﬁrms as opposed to immediate liquidation. However, banks often contract lending during distress.
While the U.K. may diﬀer from the United States due to diﬀerences in bankruptcy laws this direct evidence
is, at least, suggestive of similar behavior in the United States.
63 The history of U.S. banking deregulation
Regulations regarding banks’ ability to branch and operate holding company structures has
been subjected to state legislation since the 1920s.13 Many states imposed restrictions on
these bank activities both within and across state borders. During the 1980s and 1990s,
however, restrictions were gradually lifted in almost all states.
Until the 1980s, most states imposed some form of intrastate branching restrictions.
That is, legislation either completely prohibited branching within the state or restricted
the geographical area in which a bank could open branches, for example, branching would
be allowed in the county of the head oﬃce only. In 1985, statewide branching was limited
in 26 states, and even at the end of 1990, ﬁve states still upheld restrictions.14
Branching restrictions took two forms: the ﬁrst was directed at banks’ ability to branch
through mergers and acquisitions, preventing a bank or a bank holding company from
acquiring another bank and converting it into a branch. A bank holding company may
establish a group of subsidiary banks as a substitute for a branching network, but with
several drawbacks. Subsidiary banks must operate separate boards and be individually
capitalized, restricting loan limits. Also, the holding company structure incurs certain
administrative costs associated with ﬁling requirements to regulators (Amel and Liang
(1992)). Such diﬀerences enables a branching network to realize economies of scale that a
holding company structure may not.15 The second form of regulations imposed limits on
the opening of new (de novo) branches, protecting banks from entry by outside banks.
Diﬀerences in states’ willingness to allow branch networks sustained the development of
very diﬀerently structured bank systems across states. Where some states allowed only unit
banking, other states permitted statewide branching. Branching restrictions, especially on
de novo branching, often took the form of home oﬃce protection laws, prohibiting a bank
from establishing a branch in an area in which the principal (home) oﬃce of another bank
was located, without the written consent of that bank. Areas with home oﬃce protec-
tion were typically small towns or rural areas with a population below a certain number.16
13The McFadden Act of 1927 essentially prohibited intrastate branching by subjecting the branching of
national banks to state authority. The Douglas Amendment to the Bank Holding company Act of 1956
further restricted interstate expansion by barring bank holding companies from acquisitions in another state
unless speciﬁcally authorized by that state.
14Arkansas, Colorado, Illinois, Minnesota, and New Mexico.
15Several states, in fact, also prohibited the formation of (intrastate) multi-bank holding companies during
the ﬁrst half of the sample. Except for Missouri all states had removed such prohibitions in 1985.
16For example, in Connecticut, home oﬃce protection applied to de novo branching but not to branching
through mergers and acquisitions. In 1986, statewide branching was allowed only into towns with a popu-
lation of 100,000 or more. In 1987, the limit was lowered in 60,000 and it was completely removed in 1988.
Minnesota, in 1977, permitted two detached facilities in the municipality of the principal oﬃce or within 25
7Eﬀectively, such laws gave many small community banks home turf, shielding them from
competitive pressures. At the same time, banks’ inability to diversify their portfolios geo-
graphically created a close interdependency between the local economy and the health of
local banks.
When states began relaxing branching restrictions, typically branching by mergers or
acquisitions were authorized earlier than de novo branching. In fact, more than 10 states
only permitted statewide de novo branching well into the 1990s.17 Considerable consol-
idation, predominantly through mergers and acquisitions, followed states’ deregulations.
Many bank holding companies jumped at the opportunity to convert their organization
into a branching network (e.g., McLaughlin (1995)) and the number of small community
banks dropped considerably as they were attractive buy-out targets. At the beginning of
our sample, the share of assets held by very small banks—banks with less than 25 million
1982-dollars in assets—was 35 percent. At the end of our sample this fraction had dropped
to 0.6 percent.18 As a result, banks’ average size increased. Increased competitive pressure,
geographic diversiﬁcation, and scale-economies on both the loan- and deposit-side, aﬀected
loan losses and the cost of capital, and hence loan interest rates. Jayaratne and Strahan
(1998) ﬁnd that relaxation of intrastate branching restrictions were the source of large im-
provements in the eﬃciency of bank lending allowing better-run banks to capture a larger
share of local markets. Low-cost banks grew faster than under-performing banks follow-
ing deregulation and state averages for loan losses and operating expenses fell. Jayaratne
and Strahan show that eﬃciency gains were passed on to borrowers as banks’ average in-
terest income per loan fell.19 Large banks pursued branching aggressively but also some
community banks engaged in branching in order to stay competitive (Wirtz (2005)).
There is evidence that consolidation spurred new branching in local bank markets.
Berger, Bonime, Goldberg, and White (1999) demonstrate that mergers and acquisitions
explain 20 percent of subsequent de novo entry in metropolitan markets and 10 percent in
rural markets, consistent with the suggestion that the reduction in small business lending
miles of the principal oﬃce, unless such location was in a municipality with a population less than 10,000
and diﬀerent from that of the principal oﬃce, in which case written consent from incumbent banks was
required. While the limit on the number of branches was later relaxed, the home oﬃce protection rule for
municipalities of less than 10,000 population is still in place today.
17Kroszner and Strahan (1999) analyze the determinants of bank deregulation and ﬁnd that states with
more ﬁnancially unstable banks tended to deregulate earlier. Also, states with many small ﬁrms deregulated
earlier, consistent with our hypothesis that deregulation-induced competition may be particularly important
for small ﬁrms.
18Authors’ calculations from call report data.
19They estimate that average loan rates fell by an amount corresponding to three-ﬁfths of the reduction
in loan losses and only ﬁnd small, generally statistically insigniﬁcant, increases in bank proﬁtability after
deregulation.
8due to consolidation is partly replaced by lending of new entrants. For example, Wirtz
(2005) reports that many smaller banks have reportedly branched into previously unbanked
communities in the states of Montana and North Dakota.
Also interstate banking restrictions were common in many states. Entry by bank holding
companies chartered in other states was only gradually permitted by individual states
during the 1980s. Maine was the ﬁrst state to allow entry by out-of-state bank holding
companies in 1978 and was followed by other states in the 1980s. Typically, acquisitions
by out-of-state bank holding companies were limited to banks from same-region states and
subject to reciprocity, that is, entry was only permitted if the acquiring banks’ home state
allowed entry by banks from the target state, although some states were open to nationwide
entry. Reciprocity was often a regional phenomenon, that is, states in, say, the north-eastern
region of the U.S. would mutually allow entry. Most states, at ﬁrst, permitted only entry
by mergers and acquisitions (as opposed to de novo).20
McLaughlin (1995) documents that the deregulation of intrastate branching restrictions
caused changes in market structure faster than interstate banking restrictions. Banks’
responses to interstate deregulations were slower but picked up considerable speed in the
late 1980s, although bank holding companies tended to expand intra-regionally, rather than
cross-regionally.
Finally, interstate branching was permitted nationwide with the Reigle-Neal Interstate
Banking and Branching Eﬃciency Act, which became eﬀective June 1997, although states
had the opportunity to opt in at an earlier date. As the date of this act falls at the very
end of our sample, we do not consider interstate branching deregulations in our empirical
analysis.
4 Channels of improvements in personal income insurance
Banking deregulation may have improved interstate income insurance if either the level of
bank intermediated ﬁnance to small businesses increased or the pattern of supply changed.
Improved integration of bank markets caused by changes in banks’ reach, organization, and
size, likely aﬀected banks’ costs and ability to share risks. In this section, we present and
discuss existing empirical evidence on which we base our conjecture that changes in the
20For example, in 1987 Alabama allowed reciprocal entry by out-of-state bank holding companies from
the states of AR, DC, FL, GA, KY, LA, MD, MS, NC, SC, TN, VA, and WV. Acquired banks had to be
at least ﬁve years old and could not branch across county lines for seven years after acquisition. De novo
entry was prohibited. Furthermore, acquiring holding companies had to hold at least 80 percent of their
deposits in the region. In 1988, the group is expanded to include TX and, in 1995, Alabama allowed national
interstate banking on a non-reciprocal basis.
9pattern of lending play an important role for the eﬀect of deregulation on the smoothing of
personal income and the link to small businesses.
4.1 Geographical diversiﬁcation and bank eﬃciency
Geographical diversiﬁcation may have improved banks’ ability to bear (idiosyncratic) credit
risk. Diversiﬁed banks are likely to operate with fewer ﬁnancial constraints and are less
sensitive to local recessions, increasing their ability to share risk with their borrowers. Dem-
setz and Strahan (1997) show that better diversiﬁcation in large bank holding companies
permits operation with higher leverage and more business loans in the portfolio. This is
also related to bank size: larger banks facilitate income insurance through geographical
diversiﬁcation of their loan portfolios whereas the lending behavior of smaller banks will be
more closely tied in with the health of the local economy.
Deregulation may have altered the lending behavior of banks if incumbent banks in
previously protected markets were operating ineﬃciently and deregulation permitted the
entry of better managed banks. If entering banks were superior in the screening of potential
borrowers’ prospects and lend to ﬁrms with higher net present value projects, more high
quality borrowers would have been ﬁnanced. Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) argue that
average bank eﬃciency improved after deregulation and show that losses on banks’ loan
portfolios fell—poorly operating banks were either absorbed or squeezed out of the market.
4.2 Internal capital markets in bank holding companies
Banks that belong to a multi-bank organization may beneﬁt by establishing internal capital
markets, reallocating capital among subsidiaries, and share risks with borrowers at a lower
cost. Houston and James (1998) show that unaﬃliated banks are more cash-ﬂow constrained
than banks aﬃliated with a holding company. Ashcraft (2001) argues that banks aﬃliated
with a holding company have better access to external fund, and similarly ﬁnds that stand-
alone banks face more severe ﬁnancial constraints than aﬃliated banks. As a consequence,
in states where stand-alone banks have more market share, aggregate lending is relatively
more aﬀected by monetary policy contractions. Multi-state bank holding companies may
enjoy the largest beneﬁts from geographical diversiﬁcation and beneﬁt more from internal
markets.
104.3 Bank size and risk sharing among banks
There is reason to believe that bank size may be related to income insurance. Kashyap
and Stein (2000) argue that small banks are at an informational disadvantage in wholesale
markets compared to larger banks which are less opaque and better able to overcome
problems of asymmetric information. They show that small banks do not use uninsured
funds to smooth the eﬀect of monetary policy contractions.21 Ostergaard (2001) ﬁnds
evidence that these frictions are signiﬁcant at the state level and that (state-level) bank
lending in states dominated by small banks is more closely tied to banks’ internal liquidity
position. This implies that larger banks may have an advantage in the sharing of risks
with counterparties in national money and capital markets. It also suggests that larger
banks have greater ﬂexibility in their transactions with small business owners. A shift in
the size-distribution away from small community banks towards larger banks may therefore
increase the scope for income insurance.
4.4 Changes in the supply of credit to small businesses
An improvement in interstate income insurance would also be consistent with a general
increase in the availability of small business ﬁnance following deregulation, for example,
because loans enables new investment or the accumulation of other assets, leading to greater
cross-state ownership of claims. Call Report data on small business loans by U.S. banks
does not exist prior to 1993 and we know of no direct evidence on banks’ small business
lending prior to this date. Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) study the eﬀect of deregulation on
total bank loan growth and ﬁnd only weak positive eﬀects. It appears that deregulation did
not shift the overall supply of loans signiﬁcantly, although we know little about potential
changes in portfolio composition.
Several studies have used post-1993 data to address whether mergers and acquisitions
aﬀected the volume of small business lending and their ﬁndings are possibly informative
about the eﬀects of the reorganizations that took place in the 1980s. Generally, the evidence
does not support the notion that small business lending contracted despite consolidation
in the banking industry and the fact that larger banks typically carry fewer small business
loans on their books than do smaller banks (for prudential and regulatory reasons). On the
other hand, there is little evidence to support the opposite conclusion, that small business
lending tended to increase.22
21“Small banks” means those in the bottom 95-percent of the size distribution.
22See Peek and Rosengren (1998), Strahan and Weston (1998), Goldberg and White (1998), and DeYoung
(1998).
114.5 Competition and lending relationships
Consolidation in the banking industry altered competition between banks and, thereby,
the costs and beneﬁts to ﬁrms involved in banking relationships. Through the process
of lending, banks acquire information about borrowers and an informed bank can use its
information monopoly to extract rent from the borrower (Sharpe (1990), Rajan (1992)).
Competition between lenders limit the sustainability of implicit contracts and the sharing
of intertemporal surplus between borrowers and lenders as found by Petersen and Rajan
(1995). On the other hand, Boot and Thakor (2000) argue that increased competition may
induce banks to invest relatively more in relationships because the return on relationship
lending improves relative to the return on transaction lending. If consolidation lowered
competition in deregulated states, it may have improved the value of bank-borrower re-
lationships and banks’ willingness to share risks. Alternatively, if deregulation increased
competition, relationships may have been aﬀected detrimentally.23 Whether deregulation
had an impact on income insurance through changes in competition between banks, how-
ever, is ultimately an empirical question. Our results suggest that potentially detrimental
eﬀects on income insurance, if they exist, are of second order.
5 Alternative explanations for the increase in income insur-
ance
In this section we examine alternative explanations for the increase in income insurance that
we estimate. In particular, we explore potential factors other than banking deregulation
which may have helped improve the integration of capital markets.
5.1 Changes in lending technology
Petersen and Rajan (2002) document that the nature of small business lending by banks has
changed since the 1970s. Technological advances, such as computers and communication
equipment, and the advent of intermediaries specializing in the collection and processing
of ﬁrm speciﬁc information, have enabled banks to substitute hard for soft information in
the lending process. This has helped advance more data-based lending decisions involving
systematic and periodic assessment of borrowers though information about ﬁrms’ accounts,
23Considering the eﬀect of interstate branching deregulations starting in 1994, Dick (2003) reports that
concentration at the regional level increased, whereas concentration at the urban (MSA) level was unchanged.
See also the discussion in Black and Strahan (2002) on the eﬀect of competition on business creation.
12their use of trade credit, and the like. Whereas small business lending has traditionally
involved the processing of intangible (soft) information, necessitating lending decisions to
be made in close geographical proximity to the location of the borrower, the use of new
technology has allowed banks to lend at a greater distance. Petersen and Rajan show that
the distance between banks and their small business borrowers have been steadily increasing
since the 1970s.24
Banks that lend at greater distances help integrate capital markets and improve the
sharing of risks. It might also beneﬁt bank dependent borrowers such as small business
owners. Lending across state-borders improve interstate insurance because of portfolio
diversiﬁcation eﬀects, as banks bear output risk from borrowers residing in diﬀerent states.
Also, ﬁrms would be able to borrow from a wider range of banks which directly aﬀect the
availability and cost of ﬁnance. Alternatively, obtaining a loan from a distant reputable
bank may improve a borrowers’ access to other (nonbank) sources of ﬁnance (a certiﬁcation
eﬀect).
The trend of increased distance in lending documented by Petersen and Rajan coincides
with the sample we use in our study. Hence, if technological changes are correlated with
deregulation, it may be that we are measuring the eﬀect of technological change on income
insurance rather than the eﬀect of deregulation. If so, we need to allow also for changes in
lending technology in our empirical speciﬁcation.
Kroszner and Strahan (1999) argue that banking deregulation and technological change
are correlated. Namely, they argue that deregulation occurred when the beneﬁts enjoyed
by private interest groups (small banks and insurance ﬁrms) in favor of upholding restric-
tions were eroded by, among other things, technological innovations that altered the costs
and beneﬁts of restrictions. The ability to lend without soft information would be one
such innovation. For the improvement in income insurance to be driven by changes in the
technology of lending rather than deregulation, the cross-sectional pattern of technological
change must coincide with the pattern of deregulation. Essentially, states should deregu-
late only after banks had already begun lending to out-of-state borrowers and branching
restrictions were binding less.
It is, however, plausible that banking consolidation and technological change are re-
lated rather than separate trends. If lending procedures based on hard information involve
economies of scale, banks need a certain size to reap the beneﬁts, which in turn necessi-
tates consolidation. That is, consolidation proceeds technological change. For example,
24They estimate that a ﬁrm which began borrowing from its lender in the 1990s were approximately 35
percent further away from its lender than an otherwise identical ﬁrm which started borrowing in the 1980s.
13there are ﬁxed costs in association with auditing borrowers and collecting information from
them, in the acquisition and setting up of systems to process and store this information, in
the acquisition of information from data providers external to the bank, in the training of
employees to work with the system, etc. This is consistent with the observation that large
banks tend to lend at greater distances than small banks (Berger et al. 2005).
5.2 Development of national mortgage markets and expansions in credit
card debt
Consumer credit markets have developed considerably during our sample period. Credit
card loans have become widely available and the securitization of mortgage debt have
accelerated since 1980 when Government Sponsored Enterprizes were authorized to engage
in the issuance of mortgage backed securities. Is it possible that the deepening of these
markets (partly) explain our results?
In principle, borrowing on credit markets help smooth consumption rather than personal
income (Asdrubali et al. (1996)). However, small business owners may use consumer credit
for some ﬁrm-related expenditures. Also, they may substitute between diﬀerent sources of
funds by, say, using credit card debt as a buﬀer during a credit crunch. However, according
to the 1993 NSSBF, credit card debt makes up only 0.14 percent of all ﬁnance (equity and
debt), while in contrast, bank debt, as the largest external source of ﬁnance, constituted 19
percent of all ﬁnance (Berger and Udell (1998), Table 1).25 Hence, the data does not seem
to support the hypothesis that greater availability of unsecured credit card debt may be
driving our results, because small business owners do not use consumer credit as a source
of ﬁnance on a scale that may explain the magnitude of income insurance we measure.
Furthermore, for this conjecture to be warranted, the improved access to credit card debt
would have to be correlated with the cross-sectional pattern of deregulation, which seems
unlikely.
Another major development, the emergence of national mortgage markets, may also
have facilitated income insurance. The securitization of mortgage loans entails a pooling
of risk and increases capital ﬂows between states as households hold these claims through
intermediaries such as insurance companies, pension and mutual funds, etc. This implies
that securitization may be contributing to the overall positive trend in income insurance
that we observe.
The evolution of a liquid secondary market for mortgages has helped shift interest rate
25The number includes both the ﬁrm’s and the owner’s credit card debt when used for ﬁrm purchases.
14risk from banks and other institutions originating mortgages to investors in capital markets
and may have improved the ﬁnancial ﬂexibility of those institutions.26 To the extent this
has had a stabilizing eﬀect on the supply or cost of ﬁnance collateralized by real estate, small
business owners have beneﬁted too because mortgage loans is a source of small business
ﬁnance.27
For securitization to explain the disproportionate increase in income insurance in states
with more small businesses, mortgage debt must have been a suﬃciently ﬂexible source of ﬁ-
nance for small business owners that it enabled a signiﬁcant smoothing of income. However,
the use of mortgage ﬁnance does not seem pervasive enough to explain the considerable
increase in income insurance we measure. Berger and Udell (1998) report that mortgage
debt used for business purposes constitutes on average 14 percent of debt to ﬁnancial in-
stitutions, which amounts to only four percent of all funding and seven percent of all debt
(ibid, Table 2). Also, these ﬁgures are from the 1993-NSSBF which is close to the end of
our sample where the eﬀect from securitization is likely to be strongest.
If, on the other hand, consolidation improved the ability of banks to beneﬁt from se-
curitization, and these beneﬁts were passed on to bank dependent borrowers, this would
constitute a causal eﬀect of deregulation and be fully consistent with our hypothesis. How-
ever, one cannot entirely rule out that banks reaped beneﬁts from securitization for reasons
unrelated to deregulation. If this is the case, the trend in securitization should be part of
our empirical speciﬁcation.
6 Data
We use a panel of variables for the 50 U.S. states minus Delaware and South Dakota for
the period 1970–2001.28 Below, we describe the main sources of data and the methodology
used to construct the variables used in the analysis. As all our measures are in per capita
terms, we often omit the term “per capita” for the sake of brevity. Growth rates of real per
capita variables are calculated as ﬁrst diﬀerences of natural log of per capita level values.29
26See, e.g., Pennacchi (1988).
27A negative correlation between mortgage rates and the volume of securitization is often found in empir-
ical work, see, e.g., Kolari, Fraser, and Anari (1998). However, Heuson, Passmore, and Sparks (2001) argue
that this relationship may be an eﬀect of reverse causality.
28We exclude Delaware and South Dakota from the sample due to laws that provide tax incentives for
credit card banks to operate there. As a result, the banking industry in the two states grew much faster
than in other states in the 1980s.
29We deﬂate output using the consumer price deﬂator rather than the output deﬂator because we want
to measure the purchasing power of output.
15State Gross Domestic Product: We use the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) data for
gross state product which is deﬁned as the “value added” of the industries of a state deﬂated
by the consumer price index to obtain real per capita state gross domestic product which
for brevity we will refer to simply as “gross state product” (GSP).
Personal Income: We use BEA state-level personal income deﬂated by consumer prices to
obtain real per capita personal income by state.30 Measures of components of personal in-
come; proprietors’ income, wages, and dividends, interest and rental income are also taken
from the BEA.
Intrastate branching restrictions: We measure the direct eﬀect of branching deregulation
using two indicator variables: Dm&a equals one in years where statewide branching by
mergers and acquisitions were permitted, while Dnovo equals one in years when statewide de
novo branching was permitted. Our deﬁnitions follow the practice of Jayaratne and Stra-
han (1996) and Kroszner and Strahan (1999). Deregulation dates are from Amel (1993),
Krozner and Strahan (1999), and own updates from individual states’ state codes and bills
available from the State Legislatures.
Interstate banking restrictions: We measure the direct eﬀect of interstate banking deregu-
lation by an indicator variable, Dinter, which equals one in years where entry by out-of-state
bank holding companies were permitted (by mergers and acquisitions). We further deﬁne
a variable Dreci which takes into account that most states allowed entry by banks from only
neighboring states and on a reciprocal basis. We deﬁne Dreci is the fraction of (outside)
states in the sample from which entry is de facto allowed, taking into account whether
the reciprocity constraint for each individual outside state is binding or not. The variable,
hence, takes fractional values between zero and one, where the value of one means that
banks from any other state are able to enter, and the value zero means that banks from no
other states are able to enter.31 Information on deregulation dates and reciprocity rules, is
available from Amel (1993) and own updates from individual states’ state codes and bills
available from the State Legislatures.
30Interstate smoothing of earnings can occur through commuting across state borders. The BEA takes
into account commuters’ income in the construction of personal income data. Therefore, our measure
incorporates this kind of interstate income insurance. Similar holds for distributed proﬁts, interest, and
rent, which occurs when residents of one state hold securities of corporations and property in other states.
31For example, Maine allows national reciprocal entry in 1978, but no other states allow entry, hence, de
facto, no out-of-state banks are allowed entry. In 1982, New York allows reciprocal entry and Alaska allows
national non-reciprocal entry. Hence, New York and Maine de facto allows entry from only two outside
states, whereas Alaska allows entry from 49 outside states. If reciprocal entry is permitted from speciﬁc
states only, we count whether the reciprocity constraint binds for each individual state and D
reci equals the
number of states with de facto entry divided by the number of states in the sample minus one.
16Small Business Employment: We measure the degree of importance of small businesses in a
state as the proportion of people employed in small business establishments relative to total
employment in 1978, the earliest date available. (Data for the share of small businesses in
the population of ﬁrms is only available from 1988.) We split states into three equal-sized
groups according to this measure (“High,” “Low,” and “Middle”) and say that small busi-
nesses are relatively more prevalent in a state if it belongs to the “High” group. By small
we mean establishments with a number of employees less than 100. The data is available
from Geospatial and Statistical Data Center, University of Virginia library.32 Employment
is paid employment, which consists of full and part-time employees, including salaried of-
ﬁcers and executives of corporations. Included are employees on sick leave, holidays, and
vacations; not included are proprietors and partners of unincorporated businesses.
Proprietors’ Income: This component of personal income is the current-production income
(including income in kind) of sole proprietorships and partnerships and of tax-exempt coop-
eratives. Corporate directors’ fees and the imputed net rental income of owner-occupants
of farm dwellings are included in proprietors’ income, but the imputed net rental income
of owner-occupants of non-farm dwellings is included in rental income of persons. Propri-
etors’ income excludes dividends and monetary interest received by nonﬁnancial business
and rental incomes received by persons not primarily engaged in the real estate business;
these incomes are included in dividends, net interest, and rental income of persons, respec-
tively. Data is available from the BEA.
Cumulative Mortgage Backed Securities: Mortgage backed securities are net issues of fed-
erally related mortgage pool securities by the Government National Mortgage Association,
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Farm Service Agency. Data is from the Flows of Funds
Accounts of the United States (“Agency-and GSE-Backed Mortgage Pools,” Table F.210).
Lending Technology: We deﬁne a measure, TECH, of banks’ use of hard information, namely
the value of bank loans per employee by state similar to Petersen and Rajan (2002). The
data is from call reports.
7 Measuring income insurance
We measure the degree to which personal income is insured between U.S. states. Our mea-
sure builds on the method of estimating of risk sharing though capital markets developed
by Asdrubali et al. (1996). The following set of assumptions have become standard in
32See http://ﬁsher.lib.virginia.edu/collections/stats/cbp/state.html
17the risk sharing literature: a representative consumer of each region maximizes life-time
expected utility from consumption. If utility functions are of the Constant Relative Risk
Aversion variety and all regions have a common intertemporal discount factor, the optimal
risk sharing allocation satisﬁes Cit = kiCt for all t and all realizations of uncertainty, where
Cit and Ct denotes state-level and aggregate consumption, respectively. The constant ki
is independent of time and state of the world and reﬂects the relative value of state i’s
endowment stream including initial wealth.
Because our focus is the interconnection of small business owners’ personal ﬁnances
with those of their ﬁrms, we focus on income insurance (smoothing). If full risk sharing
is achieved via income smoothing, then INCit = kiINCt where INCit and INCt denotes
state and aggregate personal income per capita, respectively. If income is fully insured, the
income of diﬀerent states may be at diﬀerent levels but since the constant ki is independent
of time, full income insurance implies that all states have identical growth rates of income.
This implication forms the basis of our empirical estimations.
Let PINCit and Yit denote the growth rates of state personal income and GSP, respectively.
Under full income insurance all states have the same growth rate of income: PINCit = PINCjt
for all states i and j at all dates t. Equivalently, PINCit−PINC.t = 0 where PINC.t is the average
across all states in period t. The interpretation is that average income growth cannot
be insured through cross-state income diversiﬁcation while Yit − Y.t, the “idiosyncratic”
component of output, can be fully insured.33 We also refer to (Yit−Y.t) and (PINCit−PINC.t)
as state-speciﬁc output and state-speciﬁc personal income, respectively.
We prefer our measure of risk sharing to be robust to long lasting diﬀerences in income
and output growth. States with high immigration of retirees, such as Florida, may well see
income growing faster than output when retirees—who don’t produce output but receive
income—move in. We, therefore, consider output and income in state i adjusted for state-
speciﬁc means; i.e., we study how much g PINCit = PINCit − PINC.t − PINCi. co-varies with
e Yit = Yit − Y.t − Yi., where for any variable Xit we deﬁne Xi. = 1
T ΣT
t=1Xit where T is the
number of years in our sample and X.t = 1
NΣN
i=1Xit where N is the number of states in our
sample.
Rather than testing if risk sharing is perfect, we deﬁne a measure of income insurance
that takes the value zero if income moves one-to-one with output (“no income insurance”);
i.e., if g PINCit = e Yit, and the value one if income does not co-move with output (“full income
insurance”). More precisely, we measure the amount of income insurance by the estimated
33We could subtract the aggregate rather than the average with very little eﬀect on the results and no
change in the interpretation.
18coeﬃcient β in the panel data regression:
e Yit − g PINCit = β e Yit + ￿it . (1)
β declines with the degree of “pass-through” of state-speciﬁc output growth to state-speciﬁc
income and a value of β > 0 implies income insurance. The more positive is β, the less
state-speciﬁc income co-moves with state-speciﬁc output and we will interpret a value of 1
as perfect income insurance. We multiply the estimated β-value (and other parameters) by
100 and we, therefore, refer to β as the percentage of risk shared.
In order to examine if income insurance changes with banking deregulation, we allow
the coeﬃcient that measures the amount of income insurance to vary by state and over
time, in other words, we estimate the relation
e Yit − g PINCit = µi + νt + βit e Yit + ￿it , (2)
where
βit = β0 + β1 Xit , (3)
and µi and νt are state- and time-ﬁxed eﬀects (dummy variables), respectively.34
In this regression the inclusion of the Xit-term allows the amount of income insurance
to vary with the value of Xit. β0 then measures the average amount of income insurance
when Xit is zero.35 We will refer to such Xit-terms as “interaction terms.” β1 measures
the increase in income insurance associated with a one unit increase in X and the focus of
much of our work is to examine the size of this coeﬃcient. In particular, if this coeﬃcient
is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, it implies that the relevant X-variable has an impact
on income insurance. In the following we discuss the detailed implementation for various
interaction variables—depending on the speciﬁc variable Xit will be unadjusted, adjusted
for its overall mean, or adjusted for the mean state-by-state. We discuss these details next.
Our main interaction terms are dummy variables for various types of banking dereg-
ulation. Let Dit be a generic term which describes one of our three dummy variables for
banking deregulation, explained in section 6, which all take the value 0 in state i in the years
34Equation (1) is written in terms of deviations from state- and time-averages, hence, including ﬁxed-
eﬀects will not change the estimated value of β0. The ﬁxed eﬀects have no impact in equation (2) because
the variables are in the form of deviations from time- and state-speciﬁc means but they have an impact
when interaction terms are included below.
35Such regressions were previously used to estimate risk sharing by Melitz and Zumer (1999) and Sørensen,
Wu, Yosha, and Zu (2005).
19before, and the value 1 after, deregulation. In this case, β0 measures the amount of income
insurance before deregulation and β0 + β1 measures the the amount of income insurance
after deregulation and β1 the change in income insurance. For the continuous measure of
interstate banking deregulation, Dreci, β1 measures the increase in income insurance in a
state that goes from a prohibition on out-of-state entry to nationwide entry (that is, when
Dreci
it goes from zero to one).
Several things changed in ﬁnancial markets over the period we examine. Of particular
relevance is the integration of mortgage markets into a nationwide market and technolog-
ical advances that allowed physical distances between banks and ﬁrms to increase. These
developments potentially lead to greater risk sharing between states and because these de-
velopments partly took place a the same time as banking regulations were relaxed we need
to examine if banking integration is still an important explanatory factor when these other
competing explanations are taken into account.
Petersen and Rajan (2002) verify that changes in lending technology allow banks to
lend at larger distances. The lending technology used by banks is not directly observable
and they use as an approximation the measure of lending technology TECH, bank loans per
employee, which is basically a proxy for banks’ lending eﬃciency. We examine if TECH helps
predict the amount of income insurance that states obtain and, in particular, if our measures
of banking deregulation help explain insurance when lending technology is included as an
explanatory factor.
We estimate the relation
βit = β0 + β1 Dit + β2(TECHit − TECHi.), (4)
where “D” refers to one (or several) of our measures of deregulation. Lending technology is
likely to vary between, say, agricultural states and ﬁnancial center states, and we control
for this by subtracting the state-level average. One needs to interpret the results of this
regression carefully: deregulation allows for banks to merge into larger organizations that
are likely at an advantage in using data-based lending technology because such technologies
display economies of scale. Therefore, technological change may be a competing explana-
tion for increased income insurance but it may also be the result of banking deregulation.
Nonetheless, it is important to know if banking reform improved risk sharing even after
lending technology is taken into account.
The nationwide integration of mortgage markets may well be another reason why risk
sharing increased during our sample period and we explore this issue to a limited extent.
20We deﬁne MBS to be the total outstanding amount of securitized mortgage assets issued
by government sponsored enterprizes divided by GDP. We then perform the risk sharing
regression with
βit = β0 + β1 Xit + β2(MBSt − MBS). (5)
If β2 is signiﬁcant and positive this implies that the securitization of mortgage markets in-
deed is associated with better income insurance. We do not attempt to identify state-varying
impacts from the integration of mortgage markets. This question is highly interesting in
its own right but a more detailed study of it would take us too far aﬁeld in this paper. 36
Risk sharing between states may increase over time due to a myriad of underlying
economic causes besides the ones just discussed. We, therefore, examine the eﬀect of
including a quadratic trend in risk sharing in our estimation. For a relevant variable,
X, we specify the coeﬃcient βit as
βit = β0 + β1 Xit + β2 (t − t) + β3 (t − t)2 , (6)
where the X-variable is adjusted for it’s overall mean or state-speciﬁc mean in the same way
as in the regressions without trend. We include a quadratic term in time because income
insurance cannot grow linearly forever.37
In order to test whether banking integration improved income insurance for small busi-
ness owners, we split our sample of states into three sub-samples according to the fraction
of small businesses. We have argued that small businesses are the business units most de-
pendent on bank ﬁnance so it is essential for our interpretation that banking deregulation
has stronger eﬀects in the group of states where small businesses are most prevalent.38
We perform regressions such as equation (1) on each of the three subsamples separately
and examine if the impact of banking reform as measured by the β-coeﬃcient is larger in
the subgroup with a high prevalence of small businesses. Note, that in these regressions
36As a technical matter, we deduct the mean value of MBS because this keeps the interpretation of β0
unchanged. When MBS is not included in the regression, β0 measures (approximately) the amount of risk
sharing when MBS takes its average value. In a regression where MBS is included and MBS is not subtracted
from MBS, the interpretation of β0 is the amount of risk sharing when MBS = 0. Typically, if ˆ β0 is the
estimate of β0 from the former regression and ˜ β0 is the estimate from the latter regression, one would ﬁnd
˜ β0 = ˆ β0 − ˆ β2MBS while the estimated value of β0 would be about invariant when the average has been
subtracted from MBS as in our implementation. The estimated value of β2 is mathematically identical in
the two regressions. Braumoeller (2004) gives an elementary treatment of this issue with examples.
37We do not restrict the estimated value of β to be less than one, but a value larger than one implies that
income drops when output increases and vice versa which is unlikely to be a typical situation.
38As a robustness check we alternatively measured the importance of small businesses by the number of
small ﬁrms in 1988 (the earliest available year). The results using this measure are very similar and we,
therefore, do not tabulate them.
21the deﬁnitions of ˜ Y and g PINC are the same as in the earlier regressions; i.e., we remove the
average across all states—the interpretation, therefore, is that we measure the amount of
risk sharing relative to the benchmark of full U.S.-wide risk sharing. (Had we controlled
only for the averages in each sub-group we would be measuring the amount of risk sharing
within the sub-group and not the amount of risk they share with all U.S. states.)
7.1 Econometric issues
We implement the relation described by equations (2) and (3) by estimating the relation
e Yit − g PINCit = µi + νt + β0 e Yit + β1 Xite Yit + γ Xit + ￿it , (7)
using Generalized Least Squares (GLS). We interpret β0 + β1Xit as the time-varying risk
sharing coeﬃcient βit. The “linear term” γ X shows whether the variable X had an impact
on that the average growth diﬀerence between income and output—this is not of interest
in the present study, but we include the term, as it is normally done in regressions allowing
for interaction eﬀects, in order to ascertain that the estimated coeﬃcient to the interaction
term would not be aﬀected by erroneously leaving out a signiﬁcant linear term.
Our estimations utilize a two-step GLS-estimator. The ﬁrst step is a panel Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS) estimation. From the residuals we estimate the variance of the error
terms in the regression assuming that it varies by state—the estimates typically conﬁrm
this assumption with small states having higher residual variance than large states. In the
second step the variables for each state are weighted by the estimated standard error for
the state. It is feasible that the error terms may be correlated over time within each state
and correlated with state-speciﬁc output growth (the regressor). Bertrand, Duﬂo, and Mul-
linaithan (2004) demonstrate that such “clustering” of standard errors can lead to severely
biased estimated standard errors in the presence of serial correlation. Our data does not
display severe autocorrelation but we ﬁnd it prudent to guide against biased inference by
displaying estimated standard errors that are robust to “clustering-type” heteroskedastic-
ity.39
We also display our cental results using simple OLS regressions, which tend to give
relatively larger weights (unity) to small states. The OLS regressions are less statistically
eﬃcient and serve to establish if the results are robust.
We report R-squares for all second-stage regressions based on the second-stage regressors
39Our implementation is similar to the robust clustering procedure built into the STATA econometrics
package.
22after the estimates of state and time speciﬁc dummy variables have been subtracted out.
Starting from this “adjusted” regressor, we compute an R-squared in the usual fashion.
7.2 Proprietors’ income
Proprietors are typically dependent on banks to the same degree as small business owners
and we would also like to examine if banking reform lead to disproportionately higher
income insurance for proprietors. We do not directly observe the production output from
proprietors and we, therefore, cannot directly estimate the amount of income insurance
obtained by proprietors. However, we can examine if proprietors’ income has become
less sensitive to output growth following banking reform. We estimate the amount of
proprietors’ income “smoothing” from the regression
g PROPINCit = µi + νt + β0 e Yit + β1 Dite Yit + γ Dit + ￿it , (8)
where PROPINCit measures aggregate proprietors’ income in state i in period t and D is
one (or several) of our measures of deregulation. Here, a positive value of β0 implies that
proprietors’ income co-moves with output and a value larger than 100 percent implies that
a given percentage shock to state-level output is associated with a more than 100 percent
change in proprietors’ income in the same direction. A negative value of β1 indicates that
an increase in the D variable typically is associated with less sensitivity of proprietors’
income to output shocks. We consider the negative of the estimated value of β1 a proxy
for the measured eﬀect on small business owners’ income insurance. For completeness, we
also examine if wage income and dividend, interest, and rental income have become less
sensitive to output growth following deregulation.
8 Results and discussion
8.1 Descriptive Figures and Tables
Figure 1 displays a graph of the average value of Dreci across states for each year in our
sample and, similarly, the value Dreci over time for 3 randomly selected states. For Idaho the
variable looks much like a dummy variable while for Michigan and New York, the variable
gradually increases from 0 to 1 during the period from the early 1980s to the mid-1990s.
Figure 2 displays the growth rates of GSP and personal income for the average U.S. state
and the state-speciﬁc (state minus average) growth rates of GSP and personal income for
Idaho, Michigan, and New York. It appears that volatility of state-level GSP declined after
23deregulation as documented by Morgan et al. (2004) (Panel A). Panels B–D show that large
ﬂuctuations in state-speciﬁc GSP are typically associated with large ﬂuctuations in personal
income, but the latter are damped relative to those of GSP, reﬂecting interstate income
insurance. We mark the dates of the three discrete banking deregulations by vertical lines
and we display the correlation of state-speciﬁc income with state-speciﬁc GSP before and
after deregulation. For the displayed states the correlation of personal income with GSP
declined after each type of deregulation.
Figure 3 shows similar graphs with proprietors’ income instead of personal income.
The volatility of proprietors’ income has declined considerably since the early 1980s where
proprietors’ income displayed extremely high sensitivity to GSP-shocks. During that period
ﬂuctuations in GSP were strongly ampliﬁed in proprietors’ income (Panel A). For the three
selected states we observe a strong decline in the amplitude of state-speciﬁc proprietors’
income in the period after banking reform. While changes in GSP are not equivalent to
“endowment shocks” for proprietors, this pattern is nevertheless consistent with better
income insurance for proprietors following banking deregulation.
Table 2 displays the average values, standard deviations and correlations for our dereg-
ulation variables. The mean value of the dummy variables has a simple interpretation as
the fraction of the sample for which the particular form of deregulation has been in place.
For example, on average states had removed restrictions on intrastate branching by mergers
and acquisitions for 60 percent of the years in our sample.
The correlation matrix shows that all our integration measures are positively correlated,
in particular, the pair of intrastate deregulation variables and the pair of interstate deregu-
lation variables are highly correlated; 0.83 and 0.79 respectively. This makes it diﬃcult to
estimate the separate impact of the variables in a regression that includes both intrastate
(or both interstate) deregulation measures. The correlations between each of the intrastate
dummies with each of the interstate deregulation variables are above 0.5 but no higher than
0.64. Out data set is fairly large, hence a correlation of this magnitude may potentially,
but not necessarily, be too high to for us to separate the impact of intrastate from inter-
state deregulation. The measure of lending technology is quite highly correlated with the
interstate deregulation dummies, with correlations of around 0.5, but less correlated with
the measures of intrastate deregulation.
248.2 Bank reform and income insurance
Did interstate income insurance increase following banking reform? In Table 3 we examine
whether risk sharing improved following deregulation. In the top part of the table, we
display results for each deregulation measure separately, for all measures together, and
for combinations of measures, in order to establish which of the variables capture the
eﬀect of deregulation best. At the bottom part of Table 3 we display the coeﬃcients
of the deregulation variables in non-interacted form. The coeﬃcient estimates of the non-
interacted terms show whether output in deregulated states tend to grow faster than income.
This question is not of interest for the purposes of our study and the variables are included
as a control variables—we suppress the non-interacted coeﬃcients in the following tables
(but continue to include them in the regressions).
The ﬁrst four columns of Table 3 show that each banking deregulation variable strongly
and signiﬁcantly predicts higher income insurance. In particular, income insurance was, on
average, 45 percent before deregulation of restrictions on branching by mergers and acquisi-
tions, confer the coeﬃcient on GSP in column (1). This estimate is large in economic terms
and strongly signiﬁcant.40 After deregulation, the amount of income insurance increased to
55.3 (45.0+10.3) percent. The estimated impact (10.3) of banking deregulation is large in
economic terms and the estimate is statistically signiﬁcant at the usual ﬁve percent level.
The results in columns (2) and (3) are of similar magnitude, while the estimated impact of
interstate deregulation, as measured by Dreci, is even larger with an increase in risk sharing
of almost 18 percent.
In column (5) we include all four measures of deregulation. The estimated impact of
Dreci is about unchanged, but the estimated impact of Dnovo and interstate deregulation
Dinter are now both negative. Clearly, the deregulation variables are so highly correlated
that we cannot sort out the relative eﬀect of each variable. Next, in column (6) we ask
a less ambitious question: which of the two intrastate deregulation variables have the
highest explanatory power, and similarly for the pair of interstate deregulation measures,
column (7). Considering intrastate branching deregulation ﬁrst: branching by mergers and
acquisitions appears more important than de novo branching. Of the interstate deregulation
measures, clearly Dreci is the most important. In columns (8) and (9) we run regressions
with combinations of intrastate and interstate deregulation measures. We ﬁrst combine the
40The estimate is very close to the 39 percent value for “capital market risk sharing” found by Asdrubali
et al. (1996). They deﬁned “capital market” risk sharing similarly to our measure of income insurance
except that they removed all federal transfers to persons from personal income but added all revenue of
state governments, not collected from individuals in the state. Nonetheless, their estimate has a very similar
interpretation to ours.
25measures from each deregulation group, Dm&a and Dreci, that had the higher signiﬁcance
in the previous columns. We ﬁnd that the interstate measure has very high statistical
signiﬁcance while the intrastate measure is not signiﬁcant, although the estimated coeﬃcient
is positive and of a reasonable size. When we, alternatively, use the combination of Dnovo
and Dinter, we obtain similar results, as Dinter is highly signiﬁcant and the impact of Dnovo
is positive although not statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels. In the following,
we run regressions of the type shown in columns (8) and (9) in order to examine whether
intrastate or interstate deregulations had the larger impact on income insurance.
Overall, the results of Table 3 clearly indicate that income insurance improved markedly
after deregulation and, while intrastate and interstate deregulation both appear to matter,
it seems that the strongest eﬀects comes from interstate deregulation. In the following we
examine whether the inclusion of other potential determinants of risk sharing may explain
these results, and whether the result are robust to reasonable changes in the sample and
the estimation procedure. We ﬁrst, however, move on to ask whether banking deregulation
had a relatively larger impact in states with many small businesses as theory would suggest.
8.3 Banking reform and small businesses
In Table 4, we estimate the relation between income insurance and banking reform sepa-
rately for the third of the states with the highest fraction of employees in small businesses,
the third with the lowest fraction, and the middle third. We expect to ﬁnd a higher eﬀect
of deregulation in states with a high number of small businesses and this result is brought
out very clearly by the results of Table 4. We display t-statistics for the null hypothesis
that the group of states with many small businesses is similar to the remaining states. We
reject this hypothesis at the ten percent level of signiﬁcance for Dreci and at the ﬁve percent
level or lower for the other deregulation variables.
One may notice the large coeﬃcient estimate for Dreci in the group of states with fewer
small businesses and, to a lesser extent, for Dinter. Both measures predict a somewhat higher
eﬀect of deregulation in states with many small businesses, but the coeﬃcient estimates for
the “low” group suggest that interstate deregulation is associated with improvements in
income insurance that do not work predominantly through small businesses. In contrast,
the eﬀects of intrastate deregulations are mainly relevant for small businesses. These re-
sults are consistent with our hypothesis that a banking system comprised of small banks
shielded from competition are prone to ineﬃciencies stemming from lack of diversiﬁcation,
scale economies, and little integration into national credit and capital markets. Our re-
26sults suggest that these ineﬃciencies are detrimental for bank-dependent small ﬁrms and
the welfare of small business owners. The results are also consistent with the ﬁnding of
Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) that improvements in bank eﬃciency are behind the sizeable
growth-eﬀects of intrastate deregulation that they estimate.
The diﬀerence between the estimated eﬀects of the intrastate and interstate variables
indicates that the main issue for small businesses is whether banks branch and merge and
less whether banks become part of cross-border organizations. We conjecture that the
interstate deregulation measures are picking up fewer of the eﬀects from consolidation and
more of the eﬀect from improved risk sharing between banks—eﬀects that are likely to
beneﬁt not only small business owners.
Also notice that the estimated level of income insurance before deregulation (row “GSP”)
is lower in states with a high prevalence of small businesses. This is consistent with our
hypothesis that it is relatively harder for small business owners to smooth their income due
to the intertwining of their personal income with that of their business.
Table 5 shows the results from multivariate regressions including both intrastate and
interstate deregulation variables as regressors. The results are very similar to those in
Table 4. We ﬁnd that the authorization of branching by mergers and acquisitions had a
strong eﬀect on risk sharing in states with many small businesses but no signiﬁcant eﬀect in
other states, while interstate deregulation as measured by Dreci had an equally strong eﬀect
in states with many and few small businesses. The results are robust to which particular
pair of intra- and interstate deregulation dummies we use, except the estimated impact of
Dinter is smaller than the estimated impact of Dreci.
8.4 The impact of banking reform versus the impact of lending technol-
ogy and integration of mortgage markets
The increase in income insurance that occurred after deregulation is not necessarily a unique
result of banking reform. In this sub-section we examine if banking deregulation is still a
signiﬁcant predictor of income insurance when we simultaneously allow for either a measure
of lending technology or a measure of national mortgage market integration.
Banking deregulation happened at about the same time as improvement in technology
made it possible to lend at larger distances. We, therefore, in Table 6, add a measure
of the eﬃciency of lending technology in banking, TECH, to the regressions that estimate
the eﬀect of deregulation for the full sample of states. The ﬁrst column of Table 6 shows
that lending technology is a signiﬁcant predictor of income insurance. However, when we
27include either pair of bank deregulation measures, deregulation remains signiﬁcant while
lending technology becomes insigniﬁcant. The point estimate for lending technology is even
negative, which is likely a reﬂection of too high correlation with the banking deregulation
variables.
Alternatively, when we include a measure of mortgage market integration, MBS, which
does not vary by state, the coeﬃcient is clearly signiﬁcant, confer column (4). The estimated
impact of mortgage market integration is not robust to inclusion of the banking deregulation
variables: in column (5), where the Dm&a and Dreci variables are included, the measure of
mortgage market integration is insigniﬁcant while the point estimate for Dreci is very close
to that found in Table 3, although the estimate now is only borderline signiﬁcant at the
ﬁve percent level due to a higher standard deviation. Using the Dnovo and Dinter measures,
MBS becomes larger and near signiﬁcant, while the banking deregulation variables become
smaller and statistically insigniﬁcant.
Our results suggest that it is diﬃcult to separate the eﬀect of banking deregulation from
other trending variables. During our sample period, states’ status change from regulated to
deregulated, and no state moves in the opposite direction. Therefore, our bank integration
measures are correlated with a trend and we examine how robust the results are to the
inclusion of a quadratic trend.
Including the trend in Table 7, we see from columns (1)–(4) that the estimated coef-
ﬁcients of the intrastate deregulation variables remain positive but become insigniﬁcant,
while Dinter turns negative, and Dreci retains its order of magnitude and remains signiﬁcant.
Including both intrastate and an interstate deregulation variables do not change the results
much.
The trend in risk sharing is a function of underlying changes in the economy and dereg-
ulation itself is likely to be a partial explanation for this trend. The results so far, however,
leave open doubt about the importance of banking deregulation amidst the other potential
explanations. If intrastate banking deregulation is important we should see a stronger im-
pact where small business are more prevalent, even in the presence of a trend, and we turn
to that question next.
Table 8 shows that intrastate branching deregulation had a strong positive eﬀect in
states with many small businesses. The result is robust to trend and the eﬀect of branching
deregulation is signiﬁcantly larger than in other states. The estimated impact of deregula-
tion is negative in the two other groups of states, even signiﬁcantly so for states with few
small businesses in the case of Dm&a. The negative coeﬃcient estimate is due to the corre-
lation with the trend. The important ﬁnding is that the intrastate deregulation variables
28have disproportionately larger impacts in states with many small businesses and this results
is clearly statistically signiﬁcant with a t-value of 2.6 for each of the intrastate deregulation
variables. As found in Table 4, the interstate branching variables do not have signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent impacts in states with many or few small businesses. The point estimates for the
interstate variables seem noisy in this table, but the overall message is that the impact of
intrastate deregulation on income insurance, in states with many small businesses, is robust
to the inclusion of trend.
8.5 Banking deregulation and the sensitivity of proprietors’ income and
other income categories to GSP-ﬂuctuations
A diﬀerent way of examining if risk sharing increased after banking reform is to consider
if proprietors’ income became less correlated with state-speciﬁc output shocks following
banking reform. In Table 9 we show the results of regressions of proprietors income on
output shocks allowing for ﬁxed eﬀects and interactions with deregulations variables. We
interpret the results as reﬂecting risk sharing although state-level output is not a direct
endowment shock for proprietors; nonetheless, a lower co-movement of proprietors income
with output following banking deregulation is likely to, at least partly, reﬂect increased
income insurance. The coeﬃcient on GSP in column (1) of Table 9 shows that before
banking reform a one percent drop in state-speciﬁc output would on average be associated
with a 2.88 percent drop in proprietors’ income, that is, state-speciﬁc proprietors’ income is
more volatile than output. The predicted impact after “full” banking deregulation (where
both Dm&a and Dreci are equal to unity) is that a one percentage point fall in state-speciﬁc
output is associated with only a 0.1 percent drop in proprietors’ income (288.4–204.0–65.8
percent of one percent). The estimates have large standard errors but both Dm&a and
Dreci are signiﬁcant at the conventional ﬁve percent level. The results are similar using the
alternative set of banking deregulation variables in column (2). The high level of signiﬁcance
of the measures of banking deregulation is unaﬀected by inclusion of a quadratic trend. In
columns (5) and (6) we examine if wage-growth became less correlated with output shocks
following deregulation. The point estimates imply that intrastate banking deregulation
increased the correlation of wages with output shocks while interstate deregulation lowered
the correlation by a similar amount, implying a zero overall eﬀect. We do not further
attempt to solve this somewhat puzzling result because the impact on wage smoothing is
not our focus here. There is no signiﬁcant impact of banking deregulation on the sensitivity
of interest, dividend, and rental income to output shocks, confer columns (7) and (8). This
29result is intuitive because such income to a large extent is diversiﬁed across the United
States.
8.6 Robustness
We, next, consider the robustness of our results: we examine whether the results are un-
changed if the small more volatile oil states, Alaska and Wyoming, are dropped from the
sample; and we examine whether the results are similar when we use OLS, rather than
GLS, estimation—OLS estimation, being un-weighted, is likely to give larger weight to
smaller states. Table 10 displays the estimated impact of banking deregulation in the case
with and without a quadratic trend for the case where Alaska and Wyoming are omitted
from the sample. The results are similar to those obtained with Alaska and Wyoming,
except that all banking deregulation variables are insigniﬁcant when a quadratic trend is
included. Comparing with Tables 3 and 7, it is evident that the estimated coeﬃcients be-
come more sensitive to inclusion of a trend when Alaska and Wyoming are omitted. This
obtains because the two states are inﬂuential observations and the trend is highly correlated
with especially the interstate deregulation variables (the unilateral correlation coeﬃcient is
around 0.8 for each of the two interstate deregulation variables and 0.5-0.6 for the intrastate
deregulation variables).41
However, Table 11 shows that our main result, that intrastate banking deregulation
had a disproportionately large and positive eﬀect on risk sharing in states with many small
businesses, still holds whether a trend is included or not. In fact, the statistical null-
hypothesis that states with many small businesses obtain no more risk sharing than other
states is rejected with even higher levels of signiﬁcance when Alaska and Wyoming are left
out. Notice that Alaska and Wyoming both fall in the HIGH group when included, hence
the states the comprise this group change somewhat when we omit these two states from
the sample.
Table 12 reveals that our results for the sensitivity of proprietors’ income to output
shocks are robust to the exclusions of Alaska and Wyoming, although the statistical sig-
niﬁcance of the coeﬃcients are slightly lower. Similarly for wage and dividend, rental, and
interest income. However, all of regressions involving proprietors’ income have at least one
deregulation variable signiﬁcant at the ﬁve percent level.
Table 13 displays the results when OLS estimation is used. The estimated coeﬃcients
41Omitting AK and WY causes a drop in R2 because AK and WY has high variation in output and hence
the total sum of squares is large and the model explains relatively more of it (as the error sum of squares is
of similar magnitude in the regressions with and without AK and WY).
30are all very large and highly signiﬁcant, with the exception of Dinter when a quadratic
trend is included. The point estimates are somewhat high, implying that moving from no
deregulation to full intrastate and interstate deregulation improves income insurance by
about 40 percentage points, which is likely a reﬂection of the higher weight given to smaller
states in the sample with OLS.
Finally, Table 14 shows that the ﬁnding that intrastate banking deregulation had a
stronger impact in states with many small businesses is robust to OLS-estimation. The
overall pattern of the results are very similar under GLS and OLS-estimation and the
estimated diﬀerential impact in states with more or less small businesses is even stronger
when OLS is used. We consider the OLS-estimates more noisy than the GLS-estimates but,
clearly, our conclusions hold up using this simple estimator.
9 Conclusion
This paper provides evidence that U. S. banking deregulation and the consequent changes
in bank market structure had signiﬁcant real eﬀects on the economy through the role played
by banks as the main source of funds for small businesses.
In particular, we demonstrate that interstate risk sharing at the income level (income
insurance) increased signiﬁcantly in states which deregulated restrictions on banks’ ability
to operate branching networks or holding companies within or between states. We hypoth-
esize that an important channel for this eﬀect goes through small businesses because of
the intertwining of the personal ﬁnances of bank-dependent small business owners with the
ﬁnances of their ﬁrms. We ﬁnd two sets of results consistent with this hypothesis. First, we
show that the positive eﬀect of deregulation on income insurance is signiﬁcantly stronger in
states where small businesses are more important, measured in terms of share of employ-
ment. Second, we show that proprietors’ income is considerably less sensitive to output
shocks following banking deregulation. We conjecture that the changes in the U.S. bank-
ing industry that have lead to an improvement in income insurance are due to improved
eﬃciency in lending to small businesses after deregulation and to improved eﬃciency of
interbank capital allocation.
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36Table 1:
Year of Banking Deregulation
Statewide Interstate Statewide
States branching through banking de novo branching
M&As permitted permitted permitted
Alabama 1981 1987 1990
Alaska 1960 1982 1960
Arizona 1960 1986 1960
Arkansas 1994 1989 1999
California 1960 1987 1960
Colorado 1991 1988 1997
Connecticut 1980 1983 1988
Delaware 1960 1988 1960
District of Columbia 1960 1985 1960
Florida 1988 1985 1988
Georgia 1983 1985 1998
Hawaii 1986 1995 1986
Idaho 1960 1985 1960
Illinois 1988 1986 1993
Indiana 1989 1986 1991
Iowa 1997 1991 ***
Kansas 1987 1992 1990
Kentucky 1990 1984 2001
Louisiana 1988 1987 1988
Maine 1975 1978 1975
Maryland 1960 1985 1960
Massachusetts 1984 1983 1984
Michigan 1987 1986 1988
Minnesota 1993 1986 ***
Mississippi 1986 1988 1989
Missouri 1990 1986 1990
Montana 1990 1993 1997
Nebraska 1985 1990 ***
Nevada 1960 1985 1960
New Hampshire 1987 1987 1987
New Jersey 1977 1986 1996
New Mexico 1991 1989 1991
New York 1976 1982 ***
North Carolina 1960 1985 1960
North Dakota 1987 1991 1996
Ohio 1979 1985 1989
Oklahoma 1988 1987 2000
Oregon 1985 1986 1985
Pennsylvania 1982 1986 1989
Rhode Island 1960 1984 1960
South Carolina 1960 1986 1960
South Dakota 1960 1988 1960
Tennessee 1985 1985 1990
Texas 1988 1987 1988
Utah 1981 1984 1981
Vermont 1970 1988 1970
Virginia 1978 1985 1986
Washington 1985 1987 1985
West Virginia 1987 1988 1987
Wisconsin 1990 1987 1989
Wyoming 1988 1987 1999
Source: Amel (1993), Kroszner and Strahan (1999), and authors’ updates from individual states’
State Codes available from the State Legislatures. For states that deregulated before 1960 the date
is listed as 1960. *** indicates that states did not deregulate until the end of the sample period,
2001.
37Table 2:
Measures of Banking Deregulation. Descriptive Statistics
Means and Standard Deviations
Mean Std. Dev. Sample
Dm&a 0.60 0.49 1970–2001
Dnovo 0.47 0.50 1970–2001
Dinter 0.48 0.50 1970–2001
Dreci 0.35 0.44 1970–2001
TECH 6.92 0.13 1970–2001
Correlations
Dm&a Dnovo Dinter Dreci TECH
Dm&a 1.00 0.76 0.64 0.59 0.31
Dnovo – 1.00 0.51 0.51 0.26
Dinter – – 1.00 0.83 0.52
Dreci – – – 1.00 0.52
TECH – – – – 1.00
Note: Dm&a is an indicator variable that equals one in years where statewide branching by merg-
ers and acquisitions were permitted; Dnovo is an indicator variable that equals one in years when
statewide de novo branching was permitted; Dinter is an indicator variable which equals one in years
where entry by out-of-state bank holding companies were permitted. Dreci is the fraction of (out-
side) states in the sample from which entry is de facto allowed, taking into account whether the
reciprocity constraint for each individual outside state is binding or not. TECH (lending technology)
is the log of the value of bank loans scaled by the number of bank employees in state i at date t.
The correlation of TECH with the other variables is the calculated for TECH minus the mean for each
state corresponding to the way it is interacted with output growth in the regression tables. Sample
is 1970–2001; District of Columbia and the states of Delaware and South Dakota are excluded.
38Table 3:
Banking Deregulation and Income Insurance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
GSP 45.0 46.1 46.8 46.4 44.8 44.9 46.6 44.8 44.7
(2.7) (2.4) (2.1) (2.0) (2.7) (2.7) (2.1) (2.7) (2.4)
INTRASTATE DEREGULATION
GSP · Dm&a 10.3 – – – 4.5 8.5 – 3.5 –
(3.0) – – – (5.1) (4.1) – (3.7) –
GSP · Dnovo – 9.5 – – –0.3 2.2 – – 5.2
– (3.1) – – (4.0) (4.2) – – (3.5)
INTERSTATE DEREGULATION
GSP · Dinter – – 11.8 – –4.9 – –3.1 – 9.5
– – (2.3) – (5.2) – (4.4) – (2.4)
GSP · Dreci – – – 17.6 20.2 – 20.9 15.4 –
– – – (3.3) (6.0) – (6.3) (3.8) –
LINEAR TERMS
Dm&a –0.2 – – – –0.2 –0.2 – –0.2 –
(0.1) – – – (0.1) (0.1) – (0.1) –
Dnovo – –0.0 – – 0.1 0.1 – – –0.0
– (0.1) – – (0.1) (0.1) – – (0.1)
Dinter – – –0.1 – 0.1 – 0.0 – –0.1
– – (0.1) – (0.1) – (0.1) – (0.1)
Dreci – – – 0.1 0.1 – 0.1 0.1 –
– – – (0.2) (0.2) – (0.2) (0.2) –
R2 0.62 0.62 0.61 0.62 0.63 0.62 0.62 0.63 0.62
Note: Results are from the following GLS regressions: g GSPit − g PINCit = αi +νt +β0 g GSPit +β1 Dit +
β2 g GSPit · Dit + ￿it. PINCit is the growth rate of (real) personal income (per capita) in state i in
period t and g PINCit is PINCit minus its mean across states minus its mean across time. GSPit and
g GSPit are deﬁned similarly using gross state product. αi (not reported) is a state ﬁxed eﬀect and νt
(not reported) is a time ﬁxed eﬀect. Dit is a variable for banking deregulation, measured in terms
of four diﬀerent variables: Dm&a is an indicator variable that equals one in years where statewide
branching by mergers and acquisitions were permitted; Dnovo is an indicator variable that equals
one in years when statewide de novo branching was permitted; Dinter is an indicator variable which
equals one in years where entry by out-of-state bank holding companies were permitted. Dreci is the
fraction of (outside) states in the sample from which entry is de facto allowed, taking into account
whether the reciprocity constraint for each individual outside state is binding or not. The sample is
1970–2001; District of Columbia and the states of Delaware and South Dakota are excluded. GLS
clustering-robust standard deviations are in parentheses. Coeﬃcients and standard deviations are
multiplied by 100. Number of observations is 1536.
39Table 4:
Banking Deregulation and Income Insurance in States with High, Middle, and Low Prevalence of Small Businesses (I)
HIGH MIDDLE LOW t-test
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
GSP 38.1 37.5 44.5 43.6 47.5 48.6 47.6 47.6 51.9 51.1 48.4 48.0
(5.6) (6.1) (4.3) (4.5) (4.0) (3.2) (3.2) (3.0) (3.9) (2.9) (3.2) (3.2)
INTRASTATE DEREGULATION
GSP · Dm&a 21.1 – – – 3.8 – – – 2.6 – – – 2.5
(6.5) – – – (3.8) – – – (4.6) – – –
GSP · Dnovo – 23.3 – – – 1.8 – – – 4.6 – – 2.5
– (7.7) – – – (3.6) – – – (3.6) – –
INTERSTATE DEREGULATION
GSP · Dinter – – 19.2 – – – 4.5 – – – 13.3 – 2.1
– – (4.8) – – – (3.3) – – – (4.5) –
GSP · Dreci – – – 23.8 – – – 6.9 – – – 20.3 1.7
– – – (5.2) – – – (5.4) – – – (5.6)
R2 0.64 0.65 0.62 0.62 0.64 0.63 0.64 0.64 0.62 0.61 0.61 0.62
Note: Results are from the following GLS regressions: g GSPit − g PINCit = αi + νt + β0 g GSPit + β1 Dit + β2 g GSPit · Dit + ￿it. PINCit is the growth
rate of (real) personal income (per capita) in state i in period t and g PINCit is PINCit minus its mean across states minus its mean across time.
GSPit and g GSPit are deﬁned similarly using gross state product. αi (not reported) is a state ﬁxed eﬀect and νt (not reported) is a time ﬁxed
eﬀect. Dit is a variable for banking deregulation, measured in terms of four diﬀerent variables: Dm&a is an indicator variable that equals one
in years where statewide branching by mergers and acquisitions were permitted; Dnovo is an indicator variable that equals one in years when
statewide de novo branching was permitted; Dinter is an indicator variable which equals one in years where entry by out-of-state bank holding
companies were permitted. Dreci is the fraction of (outside) states in the sample from which entry is de facto allowed, taking into account
whether the reciprocity constraint for each individual outside state is binding or not. β1 is not reported. We split states into three equal-sized
groups according to this measure (“High,” “Low,” and “Middle”) and say that small businesses are relatively more prevalent in a state if it
belongs to the High group. We estimate the coeﬃcients for the pooled Middle and Low groups and perform a simple t-test for the equality
of these coeﬃcients and the corresponding coeﬃcients of the High group. The sample is 1970–2001; District of Columbia and the states of
Delaware and South Dakota are excluded. GLS clustering-robust standard deviations are in parentheses. Coeﬃcients and standard errors
are multiplied by 100. Number of observations in each group is 512.
4
0Table 5:
Banking Deregulation and Income Insurance in States with
High, Middle, and Low Prevalence of Small Businesses (II)
HIGH MIDDLE LOW t-test
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GSP 37.9 37.0 47.5 47.8 51.2 48.8
(5.6) (5.9) (4.0) (3.3) (3.8) (3.3)
INTRASTATE DEREGULATION
GSP · Dm&a 13.8 – 1.1 – –7.4 – 1.9
(8.0) – (4.1) – (6.1) –
GSP · Dnovo – 18.9 – –0.8 – –2.2 2.3
– (8.5) – (3.8) – (5.5)
INTERSTATE DEREGULATION
GSP · Dinter – 10.1 – 5.0 – 15.1 0.2
– (4.7) – (3.4) – (5.7)
GSP · Dreci 15.2 – 6.2 – 25.8 – 0.1
(6.0) – (5.9) – (7.0) –
R2 0.64 0.65 0.64 0.64 0.62 0.61
Note: Results are from the following GLS regressions: g GSPit − g PINCit = αi +νt +β0 g GSPit +β1 Dk
it +
β2 Dm
it + β3 g GSPit · Dk
it + β4 g GSPit · Dm
it + ￿it. PINCit is the growth rate of (real) personal income (per
capita) in state i in period t and g PINCit is PINCit minus its mean across states minus its mean across
time. GSPit and g GSPit are deﬁned similarly using gross state product. αi (not reported) is a state
ﬁxed eﬀect and νt (not reported) is a time ﬁxed eﬀect. Dk
it is a measure of intrastate deregulation:
either Dm&a, an indicator variable that equals one in years where statewide branching by mergers and
acquisitions were permitted, or Dnovo, an indicator variable that equals one in years when statewide
de novo branching was permitted. Dm
it is a measure of interstate deregulation: either Dinter, an
indicator variable which equals one in years where entry by out-of-state bank holding companies
were permitted, or Dreci, the fraction of (outside) states in the sample from which entry is de facto
allowed, taking into account whether the reciprocity constraint for each individual outside state is
binding or not. β1 and β2 are not reported. We split states into three equal-sized groups according
to this measure (“High,” “Low,” ‘and “Middle”) and say that small businesses are relatively more
prevalent in a state if it belongs to the High group. We estimate the coeﬃcients for the pooled
Middle and Low groups and perform a simple t-test for the equality of these coeﬃcients and the
corresponding coeﬃcients of the High group. The sample is 1970–2001; District of Columbia and
the states of Delaware and South Dakota are excluded. GLS clustering-robust standard deviations
are in parentheses. Coeﬃcients and are multiplied by 100. Number of observations in each group is
512.
41Table 6:
Banking Deregulation and Income Insurance:
Robustness to Other Market Developments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GSP 50.9 43.8 44.2 53.0 44.7 48.8
(1.9) (2.9) (2.7) (2.0) (4.7) (3.9)
INTRASTATE DEREGULATION
GSP · Dm&a – 3.4 – – 3.6 –
– (3.7) – – (4.2) –
GSP · Dnovo – – 5.5 – – 4.2
– – (3.6) – – (4.0)
INTERSTATE DEREGULATION
GSP · Dinter – – 10.4 – – 2.3
– – (3.1) – – (4.8)
GSP · Dreci – 18.4 – – 15.0 –
– (4.9) – – (8.3) –
ALTERNATIVE MEASURES
GSP · TECH 29.3 –18.4 –7.9 – – –
(12.1) (18.6) (18.7) – – –
GSP · MBS – – – 0.5 0.0 0.3
– – – (0.1) (0.3) (0.2)
R2 0.59 0.63 0.63 0.61 0.63 0.62
Note: Results are from the following GLS regressions: g GSPit − g PINCit = αi +νt +β0 g GSPit +β1 Dk
it +
β2 Dm
it + β3 g GSPit · Dk
it + β4 g GSPit · Dm
it + β5 Xit + β6 g GSPit · Xit + ￿it. Xit is TECHit in the ﬁrst three
columns and MBSit in columns four to six. TECH (lending technology) is the log of the value of
bank loans scaled by the number of bank employees in state i at date t. MBS is the ratio of the
cumulative outstanding volume of mortgage backed securities issued by Government Sponsored
Enterprizes scaled by U.S. GDP (divided by 106 for scaling). PINCit is the growth rate of (real)
personal income (per capita) in state i in period t and g PINCit is PINCit minus its mean across states
minus its mean across time. GSPit and g GSPit are deﬁned similarly using gross state product. αi
(not reported) is a state ﬁxed eﬀect and νt (not reported) is a time ﬁxed eﬀect. Dk
it is a measure of
intrastate deregulation: either Dm&a, an indicator variable that equals one in years where statewide
branching by mergers and acquisitions were permitted, or Dnovo, an indicator variable that equals
one in years when statewide de novo branching was permitted. Dm
it is a measure of interstate
deregulation: either Dinter, an indicator variable which equals one in years where entry by out-of-
state bank holding companies were permitted, or Dreci, the fraction of (outside) states in the sample
from which entry is de facto allowed, taking into account whether the reciprocity constraint for each
individual outside state is binding or not. β1, β2, and β5 are not reported. The sample is 1970–2001;
District of Columbia and the states of Delaware and South Dakota are excluded. GLS clustering-
robust standard deviations in parentheses. Coeﬃcients and standard deviations are multiplied by
100. Number of observations is 1536.
42Table 7:
Banking Deregulation and Income Insurance: Robustness to Trend
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GSP 48.9 47.9 52.6 44.9 44.2 49.8
(3.1) (2.6) (2.6) (3.1) (4.0) (3.3)
INTRASTATE DEREGULATION
GSP · Dm&a 3.3 – – – 1.1 –
(4.7) – – – (4.1) –
GSP · Dnovo – 5.6 – – – 6.3
– (4.6) – – – (4.4)
INTERSTATE DEREGULATION
GSP · Dinter – – –3.4 – – –4.9
– – (4.3) – – (3.9)
GSP · Dreci – – – 16.9 16.7 –
– – – (8.2) (7.8) –
QUADRATIC TREND
GSP · TREND 0.9 0.9 1.2 0.3 0.3 1.1
(0.2) (0.2) (0.3) (0.4) (0.4) (0.3)
GSP · TREND2 –0.1 –0.1 –0.1 –0.1 –0.1 –0.1
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
R2 0.64 0.65 0.63 0.65 0.65 0.64
Note: Results are from the following GLS regressions: g GSPit− g PINCit = αi+β0 g GSPit+β1 Dk
it+β2 Dm
it +
β3 g GSPit · Dk
it + β4 g GSPit · Dm
it + β5 t + β6 t2 + ￿it. PINCit is the growth rate of (real) personal income
(per capita) in state i in period t and g PINCit is PINCit minus its mean across states minus its mean
across time. GSPit and g GSPit are deﬁned similarly using gross state product. αi (not reported) is a
state ﬁxed eﬀect. Dk
it is a measure of intrastate deregulation: either Dm&a, an indicator variable that
equals one in years where statewide branching by mergers and acquisitions were permitted, or Dnovo,
an indicator variable that equals one in years when statewide de novo branching was permitted. Dm
it
is a measure of interstate deregulation: either Dinter, an indicator variable which equals one in
years where entry by out-of-state bank holding companies were permitted, or Dreci, the fraction of
(outside) states in the sample from which entry is de facto allowed, taking into account whether the
reciprocity constraint for each individual outside state is binding or not. β1 and β2 are not reported.
The sample is 1970–2001; District of Columbia and the states of Delaware and South Dakota are
excluded. GLS clustering-robust standard deviations are in parentheses. Coeﬃcients and standard
deviations are multiplied by 100. Number of observations is 1536.
43Table 8:
Banking Deregulation and Income Insurance in States with
High, Middle, and Low Prevalence of Small Businesses: Robustness to Trend
HIGH MIDDLE LOW t-test
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GSP 34.0 36.9 52.2 53.5 50.0 62.4
(6.7) (6.9) (4.7) (3.6) (8.7) (4.5)
INTRASTATE DEREGULATION
GSP · Dm&a 16.0 – –3.8 – –11.6 – 2.6
(8.6) – (4.0) – (4.7) –
GSP · Dnovo – 21.4 – –0.8 – –3.2 2.6
– (8.7) – (3.7) – (4.5)
INTERSTATE DEREGULATION
GSP · Dinter – 3.8 – –9.2 – –13.4 1.9
– (6.8) – (5.0) – (8.9)
GSP · Dreci 16.3 – –3.0 – 33.8 – 0.8
(9.2) – (10.4) – (18.6) –
QUADRATIC TREND
GSP · TREND 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.2 0.2 1.9
(0.6) (0.6) (0.6) (0.4) (0.9) (0.6)
GSP · TREND2 –0.2 –0.2 –0.1 –0.0 –0.1 –0.1
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.1) (0.0)
R2 0.69 0.70 0.65 0.65 0.63 0.63
Note: Results are from the following GLS regressions: g GSPit− g PINCit = αi+β0 g GSPit+β1 Dk
it+β2 Dm
it +
β3 g GSPit · Dk
it + β4 g GSPit · Dm
it + β5 t + β6 t2 + ￿it. PINCit is the growth rate of (real) personal income
(per capita) in state i in period t and g PINCit is PINCit minus its mean across states minus its mean
across time. GSPit and g GSPit are deﬁned similarly using gross state product. αi (not reported) is a
state ﬁxed eﬀect. Dk
it is a measure of intrastate deregulation: either Dm&a, an indicator variable that
equals one in years where statewide branching by mergers and acquisitions were permitted, or Dnovo,
an indicator variable that equals one in years when statewide de novo branching was permitted. Dm
it
is a measure of interstate deregulation: either Dinter, an indicator variable which equals one in
years where entry by out-of-state bank holding companies were permitted, or Dreci, the fraction of
(outside) states in the sample from which entry is de facto allowed, taking into account whether
the reciprocity constraint for each individual outside state is binding or not. β1 and β2 are not
reported. We split states into three equal-sized groups according to this measure (“High,” “Low,”
and “Middle”) and say that small businesses are relatively more prevalent in a state if it belongs to
the High group. We estimate the coeﬃcients for the pooled Middle and Low groups and perform
a simple t-test for the equality of the these coeﬃcients and the corresponding coeﬃcients of the
High group. The sample is 1970–2001; District of Columbia and the states of Delaware and South
Dakota are excluded. GlS clustering-robust standard deviations are in parentheses. Coeﬃcients and
standard errors are multiplied by 100. Numbers of observations in each group is 512.
44Table 9:
Banking Deregulation and Sensitivity of Personal Income Components to Output
Proprietors’ Income Wages Int., Div. & Rent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
GSP 288.4 263.7 342.8 294.9 51.6 54.7 21.7 20.6
(40.5) (37.1) (48.2) (42.8) (3.8) (3.8) (3.0) (2.8)
INTRASTATE DEREGULATION
GSP · Dm&a –204.0 – –195.8 – 19.1 – –7.8 –
(64.0) – (57.2) – (4.3) – (8.0) –
GSP · Dnovo – –175.4 – –139.5 – 8.6 – –7.7
– (62.2) – (60.0) – (4.1) – (7.1)
INTERSTATE DEREGULATION
GSP · Dinter – –63.2 – –133.4 – –11.6 – 3.6
– (31.9) – (41.0) – (4.1) – (5.9)
GSP · Dreci –65.8 – –172.6 – –26.9 – 3.0 –
(31.7) – (30.0) – (5.1) – (7.0) –
QUADRATIC TREND
GSP · TREND – – 6.2 3.7 – – – –
– – (2.1) (2.4) – – – –
GSP · TREND2 – – –0.3 –0.4 – – – –
– – (0.2) (0.2) – – – –
R2 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.49 0.47 0.07 0.08
Note: Results are from the following GLS regressions: g INCit = αi + β0 g GSPit + β1 Dk
it + β2 Dm
it +
β3 g GSPit · Dk
it + β4 g GSPit · Dm
it + β5 t + β6 t2 + ￿it. INCit is the growth rate of (real) personal income
components (per capita) in state i in period t and g INCit is INCit minus its mean across states
minus its mean across time. GSPit and g GSPit are deﬁned similarly using gross state product. In
columns (1)–(4), INCit is proprietors’ income, in columns (5) and (6)—wages, and in columns (7)
and (8)—income from dividends, interest, and rent. αi (not reported) is a state ﬁxed eﬀect. Dk
it is a
measure of intrastate deregulation: either Dm&a, an indicator variable that equals one in years where
statewide branching by mergers and acquisitions were permitted, or Dnovo, an indicator variable that
equals one in years when statewide de novo branching was permitted. Dm
it is a measure of interstate
deregulation: either Dinter, an indicator variable which equals one in years where entry by out-of-
state bank holding companies were permitted, or Dreci, the fraction of (outside) states in the sample
from which entry is de facto allowed, taking into account whether the reciprocity constraint for each
individual outside state is binding or not. β1 and β2 are not reported. The sample is 1970–2001;
District of Columbia and the states of Delaware and South Dakota are excluded. GLS clustering-
robust standard deviations are in parentheses. Coeﬃcients and standard deviations are multiplied
by 100. Number of observations is 1536.
45Table 10:
Banking Deregulation and Income Insurance.
Robustness test: Omitting Alaska and Wyoming
(1) (2) (3) (4)
INTRASTATE DEREGULATION
GSP · Dm&a –1.0 – –7.8 –
(3.6) – (3.1) –
GSP · Dnovo – –1.3 – –3.4
– (3.4) – (3.1)
INTERSTATE DEREGULATION
GSP · Dinter – 13.4 – –8.1
– (3.0) – (3.9)
GSP · Dreci 16.8 – 0.9 –
(4.5) – (7.4) –
QUADRATIC TREND
no no yes yes
R2 0.44 0.43 0.48 0.47
Note: Results are from the following GLS regressions: g GSPit− g PINCit = αi+β0 g GSPit+β1 Dk
it+β2 Dm
it +
β3 g GSPit · Dk
it + β4 g GSPit · Dm
it + β5 t + β6 t2 + ￿it. PINCit is the growth rate of (real) personal income
(per capita) in state i in period t and g PINCit is PINCit minus its mean across states minus its mean
across time. GSPit and g GSPit are deﬁned similarly using gross state product. αi (not reported) is a
state ﬁxed eﬀect. Dk
it is a measure of intrastate deregulation: either Dm&a, an indicator variable that
equals one in years where statewide branching by mergers and acquisitions were permitted, or Dnovo,
an indicator variable that equals one in years when statewide de novo branching was permitted. Dm
it
is a measure of interstate deregulation: either Dinter, an indicator variable which equals one in
years where entry by out-of-state bank holding companies were permitted, or Dreci, the fraction of
(outside) states in the sample from which entry is de facto allowed, taking into account whether the
reciprocity constraint for each individual outside state is binding or not. β1, β2, β5, and β6 are not
reported. The sample is 1970–2001; D.C and Delaware, South Dakota, Alaska, and Wyoming are
excluded. GLS clustering-robust standard deviations are in parentheses. Coeﬃcients and standard
errors are multiplied by 100. Number of observations is 1472.
46Table 11:
Banking Deregulation and Income Insurance in States with High, Middle, and Low Prevalence of Small Businesses.
Robustness test: Omitting Alaska and Wyoming
HIGH MIDDLE LOW t-test
wo/w trend
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
GSP 30.9 29.9 36.4 39.1 47.9 45.9 58.3 55.5 46.7 43.8 54.2 56.6
(5.4) (5.4) (6.8) (6.7) (4.8) (4.5) (5.5) (5.7) (3.9) (3.4) (5.8) (4.6)
INTRASTATE DEREGULATION
GSP · D
m&a 10.6 – 4.3 – –7.1 – –14.3 – –8.7 – –16.2 – 2.4/3.0
(6.4) – (5.3) – (5.3) – (4.9) – (6.6) – (4.8) –
GSP · D
novo – 16.2 – 10.9 – –10.4 – –10.9 – –6.7 – –8.0 3.0/2.6
– (6.9) – (7.0) – (4.8) – (4.4) – (6.5) – (5.2)
INTERSTATE DEREGULATION
GSP · D
inter – 7.3 – –7.2 – 13.6 – –6.7 – 18.1 – –8.7 –1.1/0.2
– (5.6) – (6.0) – (5.7) – (7.1) – (6.5) – (9.1)
GSP · D
reci 14.1 – 8.5 – 13.9 – –7.6 – 24.0 – 13.2 – –0.4/0.9
(7.6) – (9.7) – (8.4) – (10.0) – (8.2) – (10.5) –
QUADRATIC TREND
no no yes yes no no yes yes no no yes yes
R
2 0.30 0.32 0.36 0.37 0.64 0.63 0.66 0.65 0.55 0.55 0.57 0.56








it +β5 t+β6 t
2+￿it. PINCit
is the growth rate of (real) personal income (per capita) in state i in period t and g PINCit is PINCit minus its mean across states minus its mean across
time. GSPit and g GSPit are deﬁned similarly using gross state product. αi (not reported) is a state ﬁxed eﬀect. D
k
it is a measure of intrastate deregulation:
either D
m&a, an indicator variable that equals one in years where statewide branching by mergers and acquisitions were permitted, or D
novo, an indicator
variable that equals one in years when statewide de novo branching was permitted. D
m
it is a measure of interstate deregulation: either D
inter, an indicator
variable which equals one in years where entry by out-of-state bank holding companies were permitted, or D
reci, the fraction of (outside) states in the
sample from which entry is de facto allowed, taking into account whether the reciprocity constraint for each individual outside state is binding or not.
β0, β1, β2, β5, and β6 are not reported. We split states into three equal-sized groups according to this measure (“High,” “Low,” and “Middle”) and say
that small businesses are relatively more prevalent in a state if it belongs to the High group. In each subgroup, columns one and two, has a trend and
quadratic trend included, columns three and four—do not. We estimate the coeﬃcients for the pooled Middle and Low groups and perform a simple
t-test for the equality of the these coeﬃcients and the corresponding coeﬃcients of the High group. The sample is 1970–2001; District of Columbia and
the states of Delaware, South Dakota, Alaska, and Wyoming are excluded. Coeﬃcients and standard errors are multiplied by 100. GLS clustering-robust
standard deviations are in parentheses. Number of observations in each group is 512, 480, and 480 for the High, Middle, and Low groups respectively.
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7Table 12:
Banking Deregulation and the Sensitivity of Personal Income Components to Output.
Robustness test: Omitting Alaska and Wyoming
Proprietors’ Income Wages Int., Div. & Rent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
GSP 324.0 304.1 342.2 298.5 52.7 55.7 23.2 23.3
(41.8) (39.2) (51.6) (47.2) (4.0) (4.0) (2.7) (2.6)
INTRASTATE DEREGULATION
GSP · Dm&a -174.8 – –234.2 – 19.1 – 7.4 –
(61.8) – (64.2) – (4.9) – (6.1) –
GSP · Dnovo – –109.5 – –102.2 – 7.2 – 10.7
– (63.6) – (62.4) – (4.6) – (7.2)
INTERSTATE DEREGULATION
GSP · Dinter – –115.6 – –111.5 – –5.8 – –10.4
– (47.9) – (58.3) – (4.2) – (7.2)
GSP · Dreci –83.8 – –37.5 – –21.5 – –9.8 –
(46.7) – (46.2) – (5.6) – (7.7) –
QUADRATIC TREND
GSP · TREND – – 0.6 –0.9 – – – –
– – (2.9) (2.6) – – – –
GSP · TREND2 – – –0.7 –0.6 – – – –
– – (0.2) (0.2) – – – –
R2 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.47 0.45 0.09 0.09
Note: Results are from the following GLS regressions: g INCit = αi + β0 g GSPit + β1 Dk
it + β2 Dm
it +
β3 g GSPit · Dk
it + β4 g GSPit · Dm
it + β5 t + β6 t2 + ￿it. INCit is the growth rate of (real) personal income
components (per capita) in state i in period t and g INCit is INCit minus its mean across states
minus its mean across time. GSPit and g GSPit are deﬁned similarly using gross state product. In
columns (1)–(4), INCit is proprietors’ income, in columns (5) and (6)—wages, and in columns (7)
and (8)—income from dividends, interest, and rent. αi (not reported) is a state ﬁxed eﬀect. Dk
it is a
measure of intrastate deregulation: either Dm&a, an indicator variable that equals one in years where
statewide branching by mergers and acquisitions were permitted, or Dnovo, an indicator variable that
equals one in years when statewide de novo branching was permitted. Dm
it is a measure of interstate
deregulation: either Dinter, an indicator variable which equals one in years where entry by out-of-
state bank holding companies were permitted, or Dreci, the fraction of (outside) states in the sample
from which entry is de facto allowed, taking into account whether the reciprocity constraint for each
individual outside state is binding or not. β1 and β2 are not reported. The sample is 1970–2001;
District of Columbia and the states of Delaware, South Dakota, Alaska, and Wyoming are excluded.
Coeﬃcients and standard errors are multiplied by 100. GLS clustering-robust standard deviations
are in parentheses. Number of observations is 1472.
48Table 13:
Banking Deregulation and Income Insurance.
Robustness test: OLS estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GSP 37.7 37.4 35.4 40.1
(1.7) (1.6) (2.3) (2.2)
INTRASTATE DEREGULATION
GSP · Dm&a 20.0 – 18.9 –
(2.6) – (2.6) –
GSP · Dnovo – 24.5 – 26.7
– (2.5) – (2.4)
INTERSTATE DEREGULATION
GSP · Dinter – 13.4 – –0.1
– (2.8) – (3.9)
GSP · Dreci 19.9 – 19.5 –
(3.2) – (4.2) –
QUADRATIC TREND
no no yes yes
R2 0.65 0.65 0.67 0.68
Note: Results are from the following OLS regressions: g GSPit− g PINCit = αi+β0 g GSPit+β1 Dk
it+β2 Dm
it +
β3 g GSPit · Dk
it + β4 g GSPit · Dm
it + β5 t + β6 t2 + ￿it. PINCit is the growth rate of (real) personal income
(per capita) in state i in period t and g PINCit is PINCit minus its mean across states minus its mean
across time. GSPit and g GSPit are deﬁned similarly using gross state product. αi (not reported) is a
state ﬁxed eﬀect. Dk
it is a measure of intrastate deregulation: either Dm&a, an indicator variable that
equals one in years where statewide branching by mergers and acquisitions were permitted, or Dnovo,
an indicator variable that equals one in years when statewide de novo branching was permitted. Dm
it
is a measure of interstate deregulation: either Dinter, an indicator variable which equals one in
years where entry by out-of-state bank holding companies were permitted, or Dreci, the fraction of
(outside) states in the sample from which entry is de facto allowed, taking into account whether
the reciprocity constraint for each individual outside state is binding or not. β1, β2, β5, and β6 are
not reported. The sample is 1970–2001; District of Columbia and the states of Delaware and South
Dakota are excluded. GLS clustering-robust standard deviations are in parentheses. Coeﬃcients
and standard errors are multiplied by 100. Number of observations is 1536.
49Table 14:
Banking Deregulation and Income Insurance in States with
High, Middle, and Low Prevalence of Small Businesses. Robustness test: OLS estimation.
HIGH MIDDLE LOW t-test
wo/w trend
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
GSP 30.6 29.7 29.0 31.5 50.1 50.0 56.8 58.7 49.5 47.3 51.3 63.5
(3.2) (3.0) (4.1) (3.9) (2.4) (2.4) (3.8) (3.3) (2.6) (2.5) (6.6) (4.7)
INTRASTATE DEREGULATION
GSP · D
m&a 30.2 – 29.7 – –0.0 – –4.5 – –7.3 – –11.7 – 6.1/6.9
(4.6) – (4.4) – (4.9) – (4.9) – (4.4) – (4.5) –
GSP · D
novo – 34.3 – 36.0 – 2.2 – 1.6 – –1.6 – –3.7 6.4/7.2
– (4.2) – (4.0) – (5.0) – (5.0) – (4.3) – (4.3)
INTERSTATE DEREGULATION
GSP · D
inter – 19.0 – 4.4 – 6.6 – –13.2 – 12.8 – –18.0 0.4/2.2
– (4.8) – (6.5) – (5.1) – (6.7) – (4.9) – (8.5)
GSP · D
reci 21.2 – 15.0 – 12.8 – –2.6 – 25.0 – 26.9 – 1.6/1.2
(5.3) – (6.8) – (5.9) – (8.6) – (6.2) – (17.6) –
QUADRATIC TREND
no no yes yes no no yes yes no no yes yes
R
2 0.67 0.68 0.70 0.71 0.64 0.64 0.66 0.66 0.62 0.61 0.64 0.63








it +β5 t+β6 t
2+￿it. PINCit
is the growth rate of (real) personal income (per capita) in state i in period t and g PINCit is PINCit minus its mean across states minus its mean across
time. GSPit and g GSPit are deﬁned similarly using gross state product. αi (not reported) is a state ﬁxed eﬀect. D
k
it is a measure of intrastate deregulation:
either D
m&a, an indicator variable that equals one in years where statewide branching by mergers and acquisitions were permitted or D
novo, an indicator
variable that equals one in years when statewide de novo branching was permitted. D
m
it is a measure of interstate deregulation: either D
inter, an indicator
variable which equals one in years where entry by out-of-state bank holding companies were permitted, or D
reci, the fraction of (outside) states in the
sample from which entry is de facto allowed, taking into account whether the reciprocity constraint for each individual outside state is binding or not.
β1, β2, β5, and β6 are not reported. We split states into three equal-sized groups according to this measure (“High,” “Low,” and “Middle”) and say
that small businesses are relatively more prevalent in a state if it belongs to the High group. We estimate the coeﬃcients for the pooled Middle and
Low groups and perform a simple t-test for the equality of the these coeﬃcients and the corresponding coeﬃcients of the High group. The sample is
1970–2001; District of Columbia and the states of Delaware and South Dakota are excluded. GLS clustering-robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Coeﬃcients and standard errors are multiplied by 100. Number of observations in each group is 512.
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Note: The ﬁgure shows the interstate deregulation measure D reci deﬁned as the fraction of (outside)
states in the sample from which entry is de facto allowed, taking into account whether the reciprocity
constraint for each individual outside state is binding or not. The variable takes values between zero
and one, where the value of one means that banks from any other state are permitted to enter, and the
value zero means that banks from no other state may enter. Sample: 1970–2001. The states of Delaware
and South Dakota are excluded.

























































































Note: The ﬁgure shows growth rates of Gross State Product (GSP) (solid line) and State Personal
Income (PINC) (dotted line) for the average of U.S. states (Panel A), and state-speciﬁc (state minus
average) growth rates for three arbitrary states (Panels B–D). Vertical lines correspond to the dates of
deregulation, where D m&a denotes the year when statewide branching by mergers and acquisition was
permitted, D inter denotes the year when interstate banking were permitted, and D novo denotes the year
when statewide de novo branching was permitted. In Panels B–D, the left side of each panel states
the correlation coeﬃcients between GSP and PINC for the years prior to deregulation and the right side
states the correlation coeﬃcients for the years following deregulation. In Panel A, the corresponding
correlations are computed as the averages across U.S. states. Sample: 1970–2001. The states of Delaware
and South Dakota are excluded.
























































































Note: The ﬁgure shows growth rates of Gross State Product (GSP) (solid line) and State Proprietors’
Income (PROPINC) (dotted line) for the average across U.S. states (Panel A), and state-speciﬁc (state
minus average) growth rates for three arbitrary states (Panels B–D). Vertical lines correspond to the
dates of deregulation, where D m&a denotes the year when statewide branching by mergers and acquisition
was permitted, D inter denotes the year when interstate banking were permitted, and D novo denotes the
year when statewide de novo branching was permitted. In Panels B–D, the left side of each panel states
the correlation coeﬃcients between GSP and PINC for the years prior to deregulation and the right side
states the correlation coeﬃcients for the years following deregulation. In Panel A, the corresponding
correlations are computed as the averages across U.S. states. Sample: 1970–2001. The states of Delaware
and South Dakota are excluded.
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